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  ABSTRACT 
The investors I am representing would like to know if they can be successful in the seed 
industry.  They have certain skills and abilities along with industry experience that provides 
them with certain advantages that would allow them to succeed in the industry.  The thesis 
or study will provide them with a detailed study of the possibilities and the challenges that 
are before them. 
To gain insight into positioning a firm in the industry, one must find a tool to help us to 
discover the answers to the question.  I will use “Strategic Visioning in Cascade ®“, this 
model outlines area of interest such as; a strategic overview, a value proposition, a market 
analysis, a functional analysis, financial projection and exit strategy in its total.  The focus 
of the study will provide insight into the value proposition and market analysis. 
The value proposition will follow Michael Porter’s Competitive Strategy analogy of cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus strategies.  The market analysis will follow Thompson 
and Strickland’s seven questions that lead to understanding of the selected industry. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CLIENTS AND ENTERING THE SEED INDUSTRY 
 
A group of three farming partners operate 3,800 acres in a corn and soybean rotation.  The 
land they farm is spread out over a 25 mile radius.  There is high competition for farm land; 
sugar beets to the south west and housing projects to the east (the Twin Cities is 60 miles 
east and urban sprawl has affected the price of land).  With the size of equipment and the 
strength of work force they could operate up to 4,500 acres before increasing their 
employees and equipment.  Growing the business to capture economies of scale is an 
option, but land availability is hard to come by.  Recently, they have started a trucking 
company to serve their own needs and the needs of a few other farmers.  The partners have 
also set up a small grain storage business to augment their core business of cash crop 
farming. 
In considering the economies of scope as an option to grow their enterprises, the 
opportunity of backward integration into the seed industry would provide them with 
synergies of agricultural production.  Due to the clustering of one global and eight regional 
seed companies in the area, each of the partners has a variety of experiences in the seed 
industry.  They range from serving on the board of directors of one company, working with 
research and development, producing seed, processing or conditioning the seed, 
warehousing and distribution of seed units, along with marketing and management of sales.  
In addition, they have a good connection with suppliers of genetics, and access to a 
competent salesperson with a loyal customer following.     
Their financial resources are limited, so they will need to start small and use their earnings 
to finance growth as they move towards developing a critical mass that would help achieve 
a sustainable competitive advantage and succeed in the industry.  They are willing to accept 
a less than average profit margin on the seed business if the total business enterprise would 
profit from this added venture.    
They know that prior to 1996 it was easier to enter the seed industry.  Private and public 
soybean seed research practices were standardized and available to most companies.  Seed 
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corn genetics could be obtained from private firms: Holden’s Foundation, Seed Genetics 
and about twenty other genetic suppliers.  Customers were neighbors who farmed close by, 
and there was little power of the seller in contrast of what is seen today.  
The partners would like to know if an entry into the industry, today, would generate above 
average returns.  Plus the partner/investors are looking for a marketing strategy that would 
lead to a sustainable competitive advantage.  The purpose of this research is to answer the 
partners question about entering the seed business.    
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
 
The application of “The Strategic Visioning Cascading®,” a business planning model, was 
used to guide this thesis research.  Laying out all the stages of a business plan came from 
Vincent Amanor-Boadu.  Each step leads to the next step.  The first four steps are of a 
conceptual approach of vision and mission, marketing strategies, analyzing the industry, 
and examining the value chain.  The next step in the approach is the financial analysis 
using Net Present Values (NPV) or Internal Rate of Returns (IRR).  In planning, the goal is 
to maximize opportunities and minimize errors.   
For analyzing the industry, Thompson and Strickland’s seven questions provide a road map 
that leads to learning all the important information and data involving an industry.  
Economic features are the most prevalent information reviewed in the process.  The results 
of the study should allow for a good analysis of competitors strategies and their offensive 
or defensive moves.   One should be able to see their competitive advantages, and then, 
position one’s company to compete, minimize risks and maximize gains.   
Michael Porter’s three generic competitive strategies led me to think of how to position 
Caliber Seed Company (CSC) in the market place.  The information provided 
understanding to the economic environment, such as the five forces of rivalry, new entries, 
substitutes, buyers and sellers and how these work with or against firms.   
Michael Porter’s book on competitive advantage provided consideration of how to put 
together activities that result in above average profits.  First, a firm would select a generic 
strategy.  Then they need to construct or build their value chain of activities that provide for 
some type of competitive advantage.       
Bruce Greenwald and Judd Kahn indicated that understanding the economic environment 
was important in order to anticipate what might happen next in the industry.  They also 
describe how strategy of being local or an area of focus (concentration) is easier for a firm 
to find a competitive advantage.  They argue that competitive advantages usually comes in 
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three main ways; scale economies, proprietary technology and customer captivity.  These 
three advantages are similar to the key success factors, and reinforce the idea of 
competitive advantage. 
Geoffrey Moore explained that if your two hands represent two ways to set up a value 
chain, use your stronger hand for your best strategy.  The two strategies are a complex 
system or a volume operation.  In this article a volume operation is high sales volume with 
low cost and the complex system is a high touch approach which focuses of building 
customer relationships.  One of these strategies will be employed by CSC.        
Mark Ash, Janet Livezey and Erik Dohlman’s article on the market background for 
soybeans and corn provided a base for determining revenue for corn and soybeans.  
Understanding the revenue side of the corn and soybean industries is important to 
understand revenue of seed industries.  Corn and soybean revenue gives the seed industry a 
measure or gauge of how price sensitive a farmer might be. Crop acre information from 
USDA-NASS provided the study with acres and historical yields.  This allows for a 
baseline of market share by acres of both corn and soybeans.   
In the management of cost for a global or regional seed company, Frank J. Dooley and 
Matthew M. Kurtz examined the changing product characteristics (biotech traits) that are 
causing the U.S. seed industry to reevaluate their inventory strategies.  The life cycles of 
seed products are becoming shorter.  What used to be a five to seven year cycle is now a 
three-to-five-year cycle.  So, how do firms maintain an adequate supply of products to meet 
the customer demands without having unused inventories? The optimum is to have the 
right mix of genetics and traits for sale; not too little where potentially they lose sales or nor 
too much, resulting in large carryover costs.  This article relates to the cost of the product 
and the financial resources needed to start a company. 
An investor highlight from Don Carson with Merrill Lynch writes that corn product yields 
from Monsanto are performing at a higher rate than Pioneer.  These results may be lead to 
Monsanto gaining a one to two share points in 2008, and Pioneer being challenged to 
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stabilizing their market share.  The proposed new company, CSC, would be accessing its 
varieties from the next tier of foundation seed companies to be discussed later.       
Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes and Marvin Hayenga identified the structural change and the 
complexity of the seed industry.  They found that (Monsanto owned) Holdens’ germplasm 
had between 30 and 40 percent of the market.  This reaffirms that corn products in the 
market may lack differentiation, and the importance of obtaining germplasm and 
biotechnology trait license from Monsanto in order to provide the best products available.  
Plus they suggest that product innovation may have had a slow down after the first wave of 
biotechnology traits hit the market.   
Alan Gould explains some of the relationships large global companies are faced with when 
developing and marketing a newly discovered trait.  Achieving critical mass in order to pay 
for research has caused companies to evaluate their marketing strategy.  This is where 
collaboration can help a firm maintain one’s identity, yet bring forward products through a 
distribution channel that has changed with the advent of biotechnology.  
According to Robynne Anderson, trait providers have prospered in a very risky business.  
Because the cost of developing a trait and maintaining the marketing of a single trait is 
quite large, there is speculation that more consolidation of trait providers will occur.  In 
view of that condition, small seed companies may start to look more like distributors.  But 
the report did suggest that small companies with strong customer relationships will 
probably continue to play an important role. 
Intellectual property rights and biotechnology have caused the industry to consolidate.  
Murray Fulton and Konstantinos Giannakas write that protected biotech traits allow firms 
to reap the research and development costs, but they need to gain economies of scale to 
really perform at an above average profit.  Thus, those firms are likely to pursue mergers or 
acquire other seed companies to gain critical mass.  The use of joint ventures and strategic 
alliances to gain additional market presence is also based on realizing economies of scale. 
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Philip Jones et al write of the cost not to have seed availability for customers because of 
difficult conditions in growing the seed crop.  An alternative is to raise additional seed in 
South America.  The average cost of wholesale corn grown in the U S. is about $34 dollars 
per unit.  If the same is grown in South America that cost could be at least $10 per unit 
more.  This informs the partners of the potential risks and opportunities of accessing the 
right quantities of seed products. 
Proper management of the seed corn supply chain is critical to the success of a seed 
business.  Philip C. Jones et al write that managing the process is challenging due to the 
growth or loss of sales of individual varieties and additional traits from one year to the next.  
Actual demand verses forecasted needs to be analyzed to insure proper safety stocks and 
minimize the number of stock keeping units.  CSC will need to have enough seed to 
maximize growth while minimizing the level of carryover inventory.  It also means that 
CSC must have a means to accurately forecast the seed demand a year in advance. 
The cost of seed from production to conditioning was part of the article from Jorge 
Fernandez-Cornejo.  Percentages were used to identify each activity’s costs.  This allowed 
for general comparisons in creating an income and expense sheet for a new seed business.  
In search of benefits and risk, Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo reviews the last decade of biotech 
products.  The seed industry, farmers and consumers may have realized benefits and risks 
with the biotechnology traits.  Patents allow firms to protect their investments in 
biotechnology, and the plant variety protection law allows firms to protect their genetic 
research and development products.  Through those two legal mechanisms firms can 
control the exclusivity of their products and reap the financial benefits.   In order to pay for 
research and development, firms have sought out economies of scale, which has led to 
consolidation of the industry.  Complementary products such as pesticides and herbicides 
led chemical firms to acquire or merger with seed firms. For farmers, the benefits are 
higher yielding varieties, more flexibility in time management, and lower pesticide costs 
plus safer pesticide application.   
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Trait suppliers have the most power in the seed industry; Sophia Murphy discusses the 
affect of market power concentration within the seed industry.  Her use of the concentration 
ratio was instrumental in viewing the industry today.  The four-firm concentration ratio 
(CR4) was 73 percent in 1996.  Now it is at 68 percent.  One could argue that the industry 
has less supplier power today, or those joint ventures and alliances through licensing are 
allowing small firms to survive. 
Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes and Alexandre Magnier listed the US seed corn industry 
vertical integration characteristics or activity from 1999 to 2002 showing the number of 
companies in each characteristic.  This shows where competition is in regards to vertical 
integration, inportmant information for understanding our rivals.   
What sales skills are necessary to become successful in the seed industry?  Nancy Ahlrichs 
spells out four skills of decision-making: ability to work in teams, effective project 
management, and customer focus.  Behaviors that are important for sales people range from 
initiative, innovation, flexibility, and customer orientation to name a few.  It is extremely 
important to understand skills and behaviors because those skills may be the only 
competitive advantage a small company may have. 
Corinne Alexander, Christine Wilson and Daniel Foley suggest there are three types of 
buyers in agriculture:  business, economic, and relationship buyers.  This information will 
help to development a sales and marketing approach to the market. 
The skills and capabilities needed to run an entrepreneurial business are intangible.  Allan 
Gray and Associates, in an article, explain the skills needed.  This information provides our 
investor group a metric with which to compare the skills they possess, and determine what 
areas they will need to improve upon in order to succeed in business.   
Arie de Geus concept of “learning companies” and “financial companies” helped me 
consider two strategies that may play out versus each other.  The quote that supported this 
paper was “the only real sustainable competitive advantage we have is the ability to learn 
faster than others.”  Monsanto learned quickly.  CSC will have to do the same. 
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This thesis is structured to develop insightful answers to positioning CSC into the seed 
industry.  The combined information gained should provide us with a perceived or as close 
to accurate look at the big picture of the industry as possible. 
CSC is located in central Minnesota where corn and soybean acres dominate the planted 
acres.  Many farmers are cash crop operators, and some are livestock producers.  The 
selection of one of the following marketing strategies will narrow our focus of entry in 
efforts to obtain above average profits and serve our customers well.    
1. We will look at the possibility of obtaining the low cost leadership position in the 
industry.   
2. Or is the opportunity of entry is best attempted by a differentiation strategy,  
3. And/or is there a niche to fill within the seed industry.  
This information gives direction to the owners and general manager in directing their 
company’s competitive strategy.  
The following seven questions provide information for a market analysis and they can be 
found in Thompson and Strickland, “Strategic Management”. 
Question one: What are the dominant economic features of the seed industry?  This 
question will touch on many areas of interest such as the market size, product life cycle and 
the scope of rivalry within the industry.  The study will discover who is selling products 
and buying products in the seed industry.  I will consider the opportunity for CSC to 
integrate backward into the vertical chain and what types of distribution channels are 
available.  What is the pace of technology change and how does it affect products and 
services?  I will consider the economies of scale and scope in finding a competitive 
advantage.  Other economic indicators are business clusters, the learning curve, low costs, 
the use of capital, capital requirements and the ability of firms to be profitable in the 
industry. 
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Question two: What is the nature of competitiveness in the corn and soybean seed industry?  
I will use Michael Porter’s competitive forces model:  
• Rivalry among sellers 
• Potential entry of new competitors 
• Substitute products 
• Suppliers bargaining power  
• Buyers bargaining power      
I will study these five forces in the seed industry to gain insights on the various competitive 
dimensions of the industry and of the interaction that creates opportunities and challenges 
for the players. 
Question three: What factors are causing the changes in the seed industry?  I will be 
looking for trends or developments that can create a shift in the industry.  The concepts of 
driving forces are those trends or developments that lead or influence a new environment or 
structure of the industry. 
Question four: Which firms are in positions of strength and which are in positions of 
weakness?  A strategic group mapping will allow one to see different competitive market 
positions of each firm and/or grouping of firms.  
Question five: What are the rivals’ intent and what moves might they make based on their 
stated vision, mission, goals and objectives.  Identifying their personnel capabilities, capital 
resources and other strength’s will help us to project what they may do in the future.  This 
allows for firms to be ready to move to an offensive or defensive strategy to meet that 
expected competitive pressure. 
Question six: What are the key success factors of the industry, what makes the difference in 
a firm’s success within the industry?  I will look at technological positions, along with 
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manufacturing capabilities, distribution, and marketing skills that all play a part in a firm’s 
success.  People skills and capabilities round out the major factors that lead to key factors 
of success.  Brand image, overall cost position, market areas, access to capital, and patent 
protection are other areas that can be a key success factor as well. 
Question seven: What are the earnings of the companies that make up the industry? What 
are the prospects of earning an above average profit in the industry?  For publicly held 
companies, stock market values and dividends paid to shareholders will be used to see what 
profitability level is available.     
Chapter 3 addresses “The Value Proposition”, which sets out the three generic marketing 
strategies of differentiation, low cost leadership or focus.  Identifying one of those 
marketing strategy is critical for the firm to participate in the industry and find success.   
The remaining chapters will answer the seven questions to provide perspective and sense 
making of what the industry is like, what it is doing now and where it is going in the future.     
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CHAPTER 3: THE VALUE PROPOSITION 
 
What strategic options are available to CSC should the owners decide to enter the seed 
industry?  According to Michael Porter, there are three basic strategies; overall cost 
leadership, a differentiation strategy and a focus strategy.   
Table 3.1 from “Competitive Strategies” by Michael Porter shows the marketing strategies 
of overall cost leadership, differentiation and a focus strategy.  Focus strategy can be based 
on a select buyer group or a segment of products or localized geographic area.  In Bruce 
Greenwald and Judd Kahn article, “All Strategy is Local”, they state that competitive 
advantages are most often found in holding on to customers or ownership of proprietary 
technology like differentiation, or by having economies of scale which leads to cost 
leadership.   They also argue that it’s easier to maintain a competitive advantage in a tightly 
drawn market verses a sprawling market, which lends itself to an area of focus.   
Table 3.1 Three Common Marketing Strategies  
 
Source: Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy. 
Differentiation, where 
there the customer perceives 
uniqueness from the 
company within the whole 
Overall cost 
leadership within the 
whole industry 
Focus with focused cost 
position  
Focus Strategy with 
differentiation  
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3.1 Overall cost leadership  
Overall cost leadership is based on the ability to offer quality products while maintaining 
the lowest cost possible. This position provides sustaining competitive advantage due to 
lower cost.  In order to achieve such a position a seed company would need a relatively 
high market share and/or favorable access to genetics and traits.  CSC has neither of these.  
3.2 Differentiation 
Differentiation is about being unique in the market place.  That uniqueness supports above 
average returns and gives a competitive advantage to the company.  The skills needed in 
using this strategy are strong and creative marketing abilities, excellent quality of products 
based on yield performance, long-time experience in the industry, skilled sales people and a 
trusted distribution system.  Differentiation is a strategy CSC needs to explore further. 
Creative marketing ability is needed to develop awareness and a positive brand image, 
which encourage customers to prefer a company’s product.  In turn, this activity can lead to 
increases in market share and capture economies of scale through increased sales. 
Another key for differentiation is to have researched products that excel in the market 
place.  Products that yield, stand, and dry down are key factors to the grower’s success.  
The development of a strong linkage between research and development, the product 
development group, and marketing is needed in order to provide confidence in the 
company and its products.   CSC is not looking to be involved with basic plant breeding or 
researching biotechnology traits.  Genetic corn products are selected in the wholesale 
market that includes suppliers of Seed Genetics, Thurston Genetics, Mike Brayton Seed 
(MBS), Holden’s Foundation, and Greenleaf Genetics.  Soybean products suppliers include 
Bio-Pant Genetics, JGL, Peterson Seeds, and MBS.  Selection of genetic products is one 
critical component of high quality products, the other selection is biotech trait.  Monsanto 
has YieldGard® corn borer, YieldGard® corn root worm along with Roundup Ready® 
traits.  Dow AgroScience has Herculex1® corn borer, and Herculex-xtra® corn root worm.  
Syngenta has AgriSure® traits of corn borer and root worm protection.  Bayer Crop 
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Science licenses Liberty Link® trait to the corn market.  Product differentiation is based on 
combinations of genetic and traits.    
A trusted distribution system is important in maintaining a connection to the customer.  If 
the connection is solid year-after-year, this allows the firm to maintain and build sales for 
the future.  In order to start the business, CSC must find that system.  The hiring of a 
District Sales Manager (DSM) who has a loyal customer following can be part of the 
answer.  The development of the distribution system will be a on going process of 
development. 
Highly skilled and creative people are needed to achieve a competitive advantage within a 
differentiation strategy.  According to an Accenture study, skills needed are good decision 
making, the ability to work in cross-functional teams, effective management, and customer 
focus.  According to Nancy Ahlrichs of EOC Strategies; a few of the key behaviors that 
lead to success are: initiative, innovation, flexibility, and customer orientation.  These skills 
and behaviors would be required in conjunction with leadership, general management, 
understanding of plant breeding, inventory management, marketing skill, sales skills, 
agronomy knowledge, and people skills.  Compensation for these skills would need to be 
above average for the industry standard in order to hire the right people.  Incentive plans 
should be compatible with the market share objective or the above average profit goals of 
the company.   
3.3 Focus  
Focus strategy is based on the idea that a the firm can be better at serving a narrow strategic 
target, be it a buyer group, a segment of a product lineup, or a geographic area, more 
effectively or efficiently than competitors who are either global or national competitors.  
What could make a focus strategy work for CSC would be the basic knowledge of the 
agronomic issues in a geographic area from soil types to cropping styles to weather 
patterns.  This narrow strategy would allow for a competitive advantage based on the 
concentration of advertisements, shorter delivery routes, ease of getting to the customer, 
and quicker to service; all of which can lower costs. 
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Focus strategy that understands a certain buyer group could be another part of CSC 
strategy.  Building a strong customer base by meeting the needs of those customers can 
maintain a price level that allows for an above average profit.  A product lineup that is 
narrow in scope based on maturity allows CSC to be the experts of products within that 
maturity range.  Their ability to manage risks of inventory is one key to lowering costs and 
gaining a competitive advantage.    
CSC marketing strategy needs to be based on a focused strategy in Minnesota.  That focus 
limits products to 90 day to 100 day maturity corns and 0.9 to 1.9 relative maturity 
soybeans.   The DSM needs to develop a loyal customer base.  The DSM should target a 
customer base that fits his abilities to sell and service those selected customers.    
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CHAPTER 4: WHAT ARE DOMINANT ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE 
INDUSTRY? 
 
4.1 The Market Size 
The seed industry is one segment of the agricultural input industry.  Seeds are planted to 
produce corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton and other grains, oil seeds, and other field crops.  
The dollar value of those commodities in 2005 are shown in the pie chart below (figure 4.1) 
as reproduced from, “Soybean Backgrounder” a report by Mark Ash, Janet Livezey, and 
Erik Dolhman for the Economic Research Service.  This chart illustrates the different types 
of commodities and the earning potential of each commodity.  For this study, I will 
concentrate on corn and soybean commodity groups and the need for seed products.  Corn 
and soybean prices have about doubled since 2005. 
Figure 4.1 Commodity Dollar Values 
2005 Commodity Dollar Values amoung U.S Crops in $ Billions
Corn,  $21.00 
Soybeans,  $16.90 
Wheat,  $7.10 
Cotton,  $5.60 
Other grains,  $3.30 
Other oilseeds,  $1.60 
Other field crops,  $21.20 
 
Source: Mark Ash, Soybean Backgrounder.   
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To determine the market size of the corn and soybean seed industry, I multiplied total acres 
planted times units of seed needed to plant an acre times an estimated average industry 
retail price to obtain an estimate of the seed total revenue to produce those two crops. 
Table 4.1 Estimated Seed Corn Sales, 2006  
Kernels planted per Acre 32,000 
Kernels per Unit of Seed 80,000 
Acres planted per Unit 2.5 
Total Acres in U.S.A. 81,259,000 
Total Units planted in U.S.A. 32,636,800 
Total Acres in Minnesota 7,300,000 
Total Units planted in Minnesota 2,920,000 
 
Source: USDA for acres, industry standard for 80,000 kernels per unit and writers 
assumption of average kernels per acre. 
There are 80,000 corn kernels per unit.  For quality purposes they are sized by shape; from 
large, medium and small; in both rounds and flats.  Weights will vary according to the size 
and the growing condition the kernels were raised in.   The variables I have seen have been 
28 to 72 pounds per unit.  The only exception to 80,000 kernels per unit is when unit 
weight fall below a company’s set standard, say 32 pounds per unit; they may add 5,000 to 
10,000 kernels per unit to entice customers to purchase small seed.     
Demand for seed corn has been relatively stable for many years.  As noted in Table 4.2, 
strong commodity price in 2007 played a factor in gaining corn acres, but often farmers 
maintain the same yearly crop rotation.  
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Figure 4.2 Total Corn Units sold in U.S. in Millions 
Total Corn Units in U.S.A.
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Source: USDA 
My study is based on a regional company that uses a focus strategy and markets in the 
geographic market area of Minnesota.  For that reason I also estimate seed corn sales in 
Minnesota (Table 4.1), which is 7,300,000 acres planted requiring 2,920,000 units of seed.  
As can be seen in figure 4.3 below, Minnesota is a major corn producing state. 
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Figure 4.3 Acreage Map of Corn in U.S. 
 
Table 4.2 Estimated 2006 Minnesota Seed Corn Revenue, including Biotechnology 
Trait Charges. 
Traits Percent of 
Market 
Units Sold Price per Unit  
Herbicide 
resistant 
29% 846,800 $27.00 $22,863,600.00 
Bt 28% 817,600 $25.00 $20,440,000.00 
Stacked 16% 467,200 $52.00 $24,294,400.00 
Triple Stack 11% 321,200 $97.00 $31,156,400.00 
Conventional 16% 467,200 0 $0.00 
Total Biotech 
trait Revenue 
   $98,754,400.00 
Product 
Revenue 
Base Genetics 2,920,000 $90.00 $262,800,000.00 
Total Corn 
Revenue 
   $361,554,400.00 
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Source: Percent of market from Minnesota Agricultural Statistics and prices from writer 
assumptions.  
For soybean unit sales are based on 50 pound bag units and one unit will plant one acre.  I 
assume that each 50 pound unit has 140,000 seeds or 2,800 per pound.  While seed count 
per pound varies, 2,800 per pound is considered a reasonable average estimate.  With 
7,350,000 acres planted in Minnesota in 2006, the total units of soybean seed required was 
7,350,000 units.  As can be seen from the map below (figure 4.4), Minnesota is a major 
soybean producing state.  In addition, Minnesota is a major soybean producing state with a 
short growing season.     
Figure 4.4 Soybean Acreage Map of U.S. 
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Table 4.3 2006 Soybean Revenue for Minnesota 
Acres of 
Soybeans 
Acres per Unit 
Sold 
Number of 
Units 
Product Price 
and Tech fees 
per unit 
Total Revenue 
7,350,000 1 7,350,000   
Product 
Revenue 
 7,350,000 $17.00  $124,950,000.00 
Roundup Ready 88% 6,468,000 13.95 $90,228,600.00  
Total Soybean 
Revenue 
   $215,178,600.00 
 
Source: Acres from USDA and prices are writer’s assumptions. 
The estimated total corn and soybean seed revenue for 2006 is $576.7 million, $361.5 for 
corn seed and $215.2 for soybean seed.  
4.2 Scope of Rivalry 
Bayer CropScience, Syngenta, Monsanto, Dow AgroScience, and DuPont/Pioneer are 
global companies who operate and market seed around the world.  Economies of scale give 
them competitive advantages in the industry.  Their marketing and sales skill, once learned 
can be passed along to others geographic areas to help support marketing and sales 
activities.  Government regulation and policies play a factor in the competitive nature of the 
global marketplace and can support or hinder a company’s strategy and these large 
companies have the infrastructure to deal with these issues.  They also benefit from 
economies of scope, where they combine agricultural inputs of seed, pesticide or traits, 
herbicides for weeds or disease and seed treatment for protecting of the seed products.  
Their product lineups are broad in order to serve all areas of the country and the world.  
Rivalry among these firms has become intense since the introduction of biotechnology 
traits.  Each has invested in the search for biotechnology traits.  As will be seen later, they 
have acquired other regional seed companies to support their corporate strategy.   
Also in the market is about two hundred sixty five regional and four small international 
firms.  Rivalry among regionals varies across the U.S.  Some regional companies focus on 
 21 
 
a small geographic area such as a few counties, while others may focus on one or several 
states.       
4.3 Business Life-Cycle  
The seed industry is in the mature stage of the business life cycle.  Below are examples:  
• The major international seed companies with established brands have about 70 
percent of the US market. 
• Buyer behavior in a mature cycle with a saturated market is characterized as mostly 
repeat customers and customers tend to rely on known brands.      
• Growing and processing seed is mature, too.  In fact, there is some overcapacity due 
to shifting market share.  Such share changes can lead to changing cost structures 
for the firms involved.  
• In a mature stage, products tend to be of superior quality because of extensive 
experience firms have gained from their learning curves and well established 
research and development units along with ISO 9000 programs to assure quality 
and enhance efficiency and effectiveness of operations.  The result is that the 
genetics, germination and purity of the seed continue to improve and be of high 
quality.   
• In the growth life-cycle is the biotechnology component of the products.  
Companies are jockeying for market position as new traits come to the market place 
because these products will have a limited life-cycle until they are replaced by 
superior traits.    
• Another indication of a mature life-cycle is that there is more market segmentation, 
and firms tend to broaden product lineup and increase their service as a strategy to 
differentiate oneself from the rest.  As a result price, service, and product 
competition is intense.  Managing brand image and the perception of the seed 
 22 
 
products and the company’s service continually rises to gain favorable customer 
response.   
• As the large number of sellers of traditional genetics competition intensifies, 
margins and profits tend decline.  On the other hand, margins and profits for 
biotechnology firms are higher, due to the power of the supplier of the 
biotechnology traits. 
4.4 Number of Rivals  
Table 4.4 illustrates the U.S. market share of international and regional seed companies.  
The data for table 4.4 were obtained from “Seed World” October 2007 page 12 and from 
conversations with industry representatives.  The industry has four major international 
companies and approximately 265 regional companies.  The four major companies are 
DuPont/Pioneer, Monsanto, Syngenta, and Dow AgroScience.   There are approximately 
265 U.S. regional companies, some national and some local, largely dependent on each 
one’s marketing strategy. 
Table 4.4 provides interesting information.  First notice how DuPont/Pioneer is losing 
market share.  At one time Dupont/Pioneer was very dominant in the America seed corn 
market.  As recently as 1995, DuPont /Pioneer had 44 percent of the seed corn market, but 
their share had fallen to only 25 percent in 2006.  As DuPont/Pioneer lost market share it 
was taken over by Monsanto with its Dekalb, Asgrow, and American Seed Companies.  
Dekalb and Asgrow seeds are marketed as such, but American Seed Company is a 
collection of regional seed companies that still market under their original brand names.  
The other large change in market share has been the growth in market share by the 
remaining independent regional seed companies.  In summary, one can see that 
DuPont/Pioneer and Monsanto are the dominant major international seed companies, and 
DuPont is losing its dominance to Monsanto.  Furthermore, the regional seed companies 
are still major players in the industry.  Later on we will discuss the probable causes of the 
shifts in market share. 
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Table 4.4 Corn market share from 1995 to 2006 
 1995 1997 2005 2006 
DuPont/Pioneer 44 42 30.5 25 
Monsanto     
   Dekalb/Asgrow 11 14 15.3 22 
   American Seed    5.5 8 
Syngenta     
   NK 7 9 5 4 
   Garst 3 3 4.5 3 
   Golden Harvest   4 3 
Dow AgroScience     
   Mycogen 4 4 3.2 3 
   Cargill 4 4 0 0 
Farm Supply/Retail 5 5 5 5 
Regional Firms 22 19 27 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: “Seed World”, October 2007, page 12 and conversations with industry 
professionals.  
Figure 4.5 Soybean market share for 2006 
2006 Soybean Market Share
Others
45%
Monsanto
24%
Syngenta
10%
Pioneer
21%
 
Source: “Seed World”, October 2007, page 12. 
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According to the 2005 Annual Report of the Minnesota Seed Regulatory Unit, 78 firms 
were registered in 2005 with a total of about 3,000 hybrid corn varieties.  Those same 78 
firms also had between 450 and 500 registered brand labels as well.  
Table 4.5 International and Regional Seed Companies in Minnesota 
Major international seed companies who also develop biotechnology traits 
Dow AgroScience (Mycogen), DuPont/Pioneer, Monsanto, Syngenta 
Minnesota-based seed companies 
Advantage Brand Soybean Seed, Albert Lee Seed House, Gold Country Seed, Heartland 
Hybrids, Anderson Seeds, Croplan Genetics, Circle C Seeds, Dahlco Seed Co,. Dahlman 
Seed Co.,  Earthwise Processor, Enestvedt Brothers, Galena Genetics, Johnson Seed, 
Mallard Seed, Mid-State Genetics, Neitfeld Seed, Northland Seed & Grain Corp, Sabre 
Initiatives,  Seeds 2000, Richland Organics, Terning Seeds, Inc.,  Thunder Seed, Top Farm 
Hybrids, Wensmen Seed,  Ziller Seed 
Iowa-based seed companies 
Access Seed, Ag Source Seeds,  Dyna-Gro,  Epley Bros.Hybrids,  Farm Advantage,  
Helena Chemical,  Kruger Seed,   KSC/Challenger, Latham Seed, LG Seeds,  Midwest 
Seed,  Nutech Seeds,  Pattison Bros.,  Prairie Brand Seed,  Sand Seed Service,  Sansgaard 
Seed, Star Brand, Stine Seed Company,  Wilson Seed Company 
Wisconsin-based seed companies 
Jung Farms Inc., Trelay, Inc., Brown Seed Co., Dairyland Seed Co., Kaltenberg Seeds, 
Kusselmaul Seed,  Renk Seed, Spangler Seedtech 
North/South Dakota-based seed companies 
Peterson Seed Farm, ProSeed, Quality Seed,  KayStar Seeds,  Legend Seed,  Mustang 
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Seeds,  Sodak Genetic 
Other/Foreign with small market share 
AgVenture, Bio Gene Seeds, Crows Hybrid Corn,  Fielders Choice,  Great Lakes, NC+ 
Hybrids, Pfister Hybrid Corn,  Producers Hybrids,  Trisler Seed Farms, Unity Seeds,  
Wyffels Hybrids, Hyland Seeds (from Canada),  RAGT Semences (from France), Panner 
(from South Africa) 
Source: Charles Dale, Minnesota Department of Agriculture 
4.7 Number of Buyers and Their Relative Size   
One way to visual customers is to look at gross farms sales on Table 4.6.   
Table 4.6 United States and Minnesota by Economic Scale Class 
Gross Farm Sales                                Minnesota 
$1,000 to $9,999                                      34,500 
$10,000 to $99,999                                  25,200 
$100,000 to $249,999                                9,900 
$250,000 to $499,999                                5,600 
$500,000 and Over                                     4,100 
Total                                                          79,300 
(2007 Minnesota Agricultural Statistics at NASS website.)   
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Figure 4.6 Percent of Farm Operators in Minnesota based on Economic Class 
Percentage of Farm Operators in Minnesota
$1,000 - $9,999, 0.44
$10,000 - $99,999, 0.32
$100,000 - $249,999, 0.12
$250,000 -  $499,999, 0.07
$500,000 & over, 0.05
 
Figure 4.7 Percent of Farm Land Managed by each Economic Class 
Percent of Land Managed within Economic Sales Class
$1,000 - $9,999
10%
$10,000 - $99,999
24%
$100,000 - $249,999
22%
$250,000 -  $499,999
20%
$500,000 & over
24%
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Table 4.7 Minnesota Census of Agricultural; Principal Operators of Farm Land 
Economic Characteristics Quantity 
Principal operators by primary 
occupation 
 
Farming 50,808 
Other 30,031 
Principle operators by sex;  
Male 74,469 
Female 6,370 
Average age of principle operator 53 
All Operators by Race:  
White 111,794 
Black or African American 20 
American Indian or Alaska Native 188 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 6 
Asian 100 
More than one race 97 
Spanish, Hispanic or Latino Origin 694 
 
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 and Table 4.7, (2007 Minnesota Agricultural Statistics at NASS 
website.)   
4.6 The Degree of Vertical Integration 
Four large firms have vertically integrated biotechnology and traditional plant breeding 
genetics into a powerful force in the industry.  These four have expanded or integrated by 
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acquiring or merging with other seed companies.  For example Monsanto has acquired 
Dekalb and Asgrow and under the umbrella of American Seed where they have acquired 24 
regional companies.  They also own Holden’s Foundation Seed, a major corn plant 
breeding company that supplies genetics to regional seed companies.  DuPont acquired 
Pioneer.  Dow AgroScience Mycogen brand is made up of many smaller acquisitions and 
Syngenta acquired Garst and Golden Harvest brands.  With the consolidation, of these four 
firms now control 68 percent of the seed corn market. 
Consolidation was driven by change in the coordination of the three major assets within the 
seed industry, intellectual patent protection, biotechnology traits, and propriety genetics  
(Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga). When these three major assets are combined, the seed, 
chemical, and pesticide industry takes on the look of a seed-plant protection industry.  
According to Utterback, Abernathy, and Utterback there are basic innovation lifecycles that 
occur in an industry experiencing innovative change.  At first many firms will become 
involved in the innovation process.  As products gain market acceptance and innovation 
starts to slow, each company’s focus turns to the market share potential, controlling cost, 
and positioning the product so that a sustaining competitive advantage can be achieved. 
The biotechnology portion of the seed-plant protection industry is approaching a mature 
life cycle. 
For example, Monsanto was first to introduce a biotech trait Roundup Ready® Soybeans.  
Monsanto developed the trait, and then acquired Asgrow, a leading soybean genetics firm 
in order to combine the trait with traditional genetics.  Monsanto introduced Roundup 
Ready® soybeans in 1996.  To date no other soybean biotechnology trait has appeared.   
The Roundup Ready® trait is now licensed broadly to other seed companies to incorporate 
the trait into their genetic products.  Bayer CropScience is expected to release Liberty 
Link® soybeans in 2009 to challenge RR®.  
Fulton wrote that, “in the past ten years, the seed and pesticide industries have seen a 
substantial number of mergers and acquisitions and an increase in vertical and horizontal 
integration.  The structural changes underway in the seed, pesticide and chemical industries 
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are due to a number of factors.  Some of these factors are common to all industries and 
have no specific link to biotechnology.  For instance, the mergers and acquisitions in the 
seed and chemical industries are at least in part a result of the need to consolidate costs and 
rationalize industry capacity, a desire by the management of the firms involved to extend 
their sphere of influence, and a wish by some firms to pre-empt other firms from taking 
over valuable assets.”  Traits are substitutes for some pesticides by giving resistance or 
tolerance to a chemical treatment, such a trait provides the same solution as a selective 
herbicide or of a potent pesticide, only safer and with great efficiency.  That benefit has 
resulted in shifting market share among seed companies. 
4.7 Types of Distribution Channels 
Various distribution channels are used in the market for corn and soybeans.  There are retail 
sales and wholesale sales.  With retail sales, a company may use direct marketing by the 
company’s own sales force or sell through its own dealer network or sell through third 
party retail farm stores.   
The wholesale distribution channel is complex.  A company’s branded corn or soybean 
product is based on a pedigree.  The pedigreed product, depending on its exclusiveness, 
may be available in the wholesale market.  An example of a well known pedigree is SGI 
901 x SGI 905.  When these two parents are crossed they produce a 95 relative maturity 
seed corn product.  This product has been branded and sold by many companies.   
Genetic suppliers, such as Holden’s, Seed Genetics, Thrustons, MBS, and Greenleaf 
Genetics provide pedigrees to the market.  Greenleaf Genetic is owned by Syngenta and 
DuPont/Pioneer with equal shares and offers genetic pedigrees to other seed companies.  
There are brokers and production, processing companies that only participate in the 
wholesale channel.  Transferring or reselling of pedigrees in the wholesale market is 
common and that reduces the potential for being short of safety stock numbers or having 
overstock.      
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Table 4.8 Industry Vertical Integration 
Type of Companies Vertical Integration 
Global Global; own genetics and traits, production, 
processing and distribution 
Regional’s Mostly Regional; Both own and purchase 
genetics, owned production and distribute 
products 
Smaller Regional’s Mostly Local; mostly purchase genetics, some 
own production and focus on distribution 
Source: Writers table. 
4.8 Pace of Technological Change 
Biotechnology linked the chemical, pesticide and seed industry together as science was 
able to insert traits into genetics.  These traits are substitutes for certain herbicides that 
control weeds and pesticides that control diseases and insects. At the beginning of the 
industry consolidation, the speed of change was extremely fast as companies merged or 
acquired others in order to gain economies of scale and scope and as court battles were 
fought by the biotechnology leaders over ownership of intellectual property rights. 
First marketed in 1996, Roundup Ready® soybeans from Monsanto has provided farmers a 
product that is safer to manage and has a longer window of spraying time to kill weeds.  
That has given the farmer the ability to farm far more acres.  Produces in dryer climates 
have benefited from RR soybeans because it gives the operator better ability to manage the 
soil preparations as well as to time spraying.  Roundup Ready soybeans have been quickly 
accepted by producers as can be seen from the data in table 4.9.   
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Table 4.9 Soybean Market Acceptance 
Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans Only 
Percent of Acres Planted 
State 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Minnesota 71 79 82 87 88 
Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge.  Economic Research Service.  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/ExtentofAdoptionTable3.htm  
The next introduction took place in 1996-97 with “Bt” (Bacillus Thuringiensis) protection, 
this trait is a protein that kills the European Corn Borer, a pest that can damage the corn 
stalk and ear causing a yield loss.  The products available today for corn borer resistance 
are as follows: 
• YieldGard®  from Monsanto 
• Herculex I® from Dow AgroScience  
• AgriSure Bt11 from Syngenta.   
Herbicide tolerant corn products with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® and Bayer’s Liberty 
Link® traits were next to being introduced.  Roundup Ready® corn is tolerant to Roundup 
herbicide and it controls a high percent of the herbicide tolerant seed corn market.  Liberty 
Link® corn, a biotechnology trait from Bayer CropScience makes varieties with the trait 
tolerant to the Liberty herbicide.  Its market share is around five percent, a distance second. 
Separating the market share of herbicide tolerant corn between Roundup Ready® and 
Liberty Link® trait technology has been difficult to obtain, but usage of chemical gives an 
indication of relative shares.  Usage rates were available through the Annual Minnesota 
Agricultural Statistics at http://www.nass.usda.gov/statistics_by_state/Minnesota/index.asp  
and are shown in figure 4.8 below. 
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Figure 4.8 Chemical Usage in Minnesota; Roundup Ready verses Liberty Link 
Chemical Usage in Minnesota
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Glufoninate-anmonium Glyphosate  
Source:  www.nass.usda.gov/statistics_by_state/Minnesota/index 
The comparison of Glufoninate-Anmonium (Liberty herbicide) and Glyphosate (Roundup 
Ready®) shows the increased usage of both with Glysphosate increasing much more 
rapidly.  Liberty Link products have about a 5% market share, based on conversations with 
those in the industry. 
The corn root worm trait was introduced by Monsanto as YieldGard® Plus corn rootworm 
resistance.  The intended market for corn root worm was 15 million acres of corn in west 
central Iowa and Nebraska, where root worm pressure is traditionally strong.  Two 
environmental conditions allowed the trait to gain added success.  One was it unattended 
purpose is that the trait protects yield during dry climate conditions.  Even the USDA Risk 
Management Agency has seen the value of the combination of the trait and genetics and 
developed a Biotech Yield Endorsement where premiums are reduced by 19 to 24 percent 
when this trait is used.  The other factor is extended diapose where the corn root worm has 
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adjusted to a rotation of corn and soybeans use.  Now the root worm has evolved by 
extending its diapose so that the eggs hatch later and come out two years after the field was 
last in corn.  The corn root worm trait protects the roots from worms feeding on the roots.  
Feeding injures the root and opens the plant to fungus and bacteria. By keeping the plant 
healthy, the plant is able to efficiently extract more moisture and nutrients from the soil and 
produce a higher grain yield.  University of Nebraska tests show up to 3 inches more soil 
moisture uptake with the trait.   Dow AgroScience offers Herculex® Xxtra and Syngenta 
sells AgriSure® CRW and Monsanto’s VT3, a triple stack with CRW included.     
Table 4.10 2006 Biotechnology Corn Acceptance 
Minnesota Biotech Corn Varieties Only  
Percent of Acres Planted 
State 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Insect Resistance (Bt) 29 31 35 33 28 
Herbicide Tolerance 11 15 17 22 29 
Stacked Genes 4 7 11 11 16 
All GE Corn Varieties 44 53 63 66 73 
Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge.  Economic Research Service.  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/ExtentofAdoptionTable1.htm  
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Figure 4.9 Corn Trait PERFORMANCES in 2007, 1st Place Finishes.  
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From Merrill Lynch, Over-view of an Industry  
Figure 4.10 Biotech Seeds Gain Acceptance 
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Source: Farm Futures, November/December 2007 
Introduced by Monsanto in 2005, Vistive™ soybean has low linolenic to midolenic oil.  
The soybean oil is important because it can be used in place of trans-fat in deep fat frying 
and in processed foods.  Trans-fat is a health concern and New York City passed an 
ordinance requiring chain restaurants to remove trans-fat from foods on their menus.  Many 
restaurants are substituting with this new soybean oil.  Pioneer is offering a soybean trait 
that is similar, and there will be some interesting market interaction between the two in the 
near future.    
DuPont/Pioneer and Syngenta both are expected to introduce in 2009 a gene called 
Optimum Gap for commercial use in corn and soybeans, which gives the plant herbicide 
tolerance to RR and ALS herbicides.  Bayer Crop Science is launching Liberty Link 
herbicide tolerant soybeans in 2009 and Monsanto will be bringing second generation of 
Roundup Ready® 2 Yield soybean to market in 2009. 
Table 4.11 Future Pipeline Input and Output Trait Development    
Input Traits Monsanto Syngenta DuPont/Pioneer 
Herbicide Tolerance 2nd generation of 
herbicide tolerance 
Optimum GAT™ Optimum GAT™ 
and Triple-Mod 
Herbicide Tolerance 
Insect Resistance 2nd generation of 
Insect resistance 
  
Disease Resistance   Anthracnose Stalk 
Rot 
Other Higher Yield 
Drought Tolerance 
GT/CRW/ECB  
Output Traits    
Feed High value with 
lysine 
 Improved Feed II 
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Bio-Based Fuels  Corn amylase  
Food Low-lin mid oleic  High Oleic Acid  
Sources: DuPont/Pioneer, Monsanto, and Syngenta websites.  
Market acceptance of biotech traits is obvious in Minnesota as shown in Table 4.9 and 
4.10.  
Biotechnology firms have now developed a process that stacks traits in a single plant, and 
are called a double stack or a triple stack.  Monsanto and Dow AgroScience just signed an 
agreement to collaborate on joining the YieldGard® and Herculex® trait to form the 
SmartStac®, an eight trait combination, which they expect to introduce to the market in 
2012.   
4.9 Product Differentiation Possibilities  
The development of genetics comes from planting breeding activities.  How company’s 
access genetics is based on their level of vertical integration.  Larger companies have their 
own breeding programs, and some regional companies that have skill in plant breeding 
participate too.  Their products are differentiated by the genes selected in traditional plant 
breeding.   Other companies often acquire genetics from a small list of genetic suppliers 
such as Seed Genetics, Thurston Genetics, MBS, Holden’s Foundation Company, and 
Greenleaf Genetics.  Those are the names that are dominant in Minnesota.  There is, 
however, a pecking order among seed producers in obtaining the best genetics.  The large 
genetics buyer often is given the opportunity to select from the best genetics by selecting 
first and receiving exclusive marketing rights to those products.  Other buyers (regional) 
may purchase the next set of available products.  The result of this pecking order is that 
many regional companies have little product differentiation from their competitors.        
Another component of the seed product is the biotech trait.  According to the USDA, 
Minnesota farmers planted 73 percent of their corn acreage to a biotech corn variety (table 
4.11) and 88 percent of their soybean acreage to a biotech variety (table 4.10).  Therefore, 
only 27 percent of corn acres and 12 percent of soybean acres were planted to conventional 
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(non- trait) varieties.   The larger percent is with traits.  Licensing of traits to combine with 
genetics provides some more differentiation of products.   I am observing increased 
pressure by companies to use only one company’s trait and not others.  To conclude, it may 
be hard to say that CSC would have differentiated products.  
4.10 Economies of Scale  
Economies of scale provide a large company with potentially higher profit due to increased 
market share which lowers average cost of production.  These higher margins may be used 
to lower their selling price and gain market share.  Biotech traits have high development 
and research costs.  Recouping those costs has led firms to not only sell in combination 
with their own genetics but also license the traits to other companies.  Furthermore, 
licensing traits, as Monsanto is doing, enhances Monsanto’s brand image as a trait leader as 
well as reducing the average cost per unit for the development of the trait as the market for 
that trait increases.  Similar to traits, research and development for traditional genetics also 
cost less per unit when market share increases.   
Where economies of scale exist, the purchasing and procurement of products can lower the 
costs of goods needed.  An example is the bag that holds the seed product.  Greif Bros. 
require a certain amount of bag to be purchased at one time, 5,000 to 10,000 up to 
thousands at a time, the cost per bag goes down as order size increases.  Economies of scale 
allow for lower cost as higher volume of seed is produced and processed at a time. 
Processing facilities that run large volumes of one lot of seed through the processing plant 
can reduce switching costs and ultimately lower the cost of the seed product.  Seed corn is 
separated by hybrid and different trait combination, and by grade size.  Grade size is large, 
medium and small, in both flat and round seed.  Grade size is important for the customer’s 
planter to run efficiently.  The larger volume of seed reduces switching costs and lowers 
cost of production.    Transportation is a fixed cost and the only economies of scale gained 
here is if a single buyer buys at higher levels of sale, so that the firm can deliver full semi-
loads per stop.   
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4.11 Key Industry Participants  
Major seed companies sell throughout the corn and soybean growing areas.  That is not true 
for most regional companies.  They have a market focus on a home state or areas near the 
location of the company.  My observation is that clusters result due to the learning from 
one another.  For example in Minnesota, 60 miles west of Minneapolis, there are now eight 
regional seed companies and they learned from each other.   Andrew Haapala started in 
1906 with Haapala Hybrids which sold out to APCO in the mid 1970s.  A grower and 
District Sale Manager with Haapala started Payco Seed Company.  Payco grew and 
stopped using production from local farmers.  Out of that move came Top Farm Hybrids 
and Terning Seeds.  When Payco was acquired by another firm, one of the founders of 
Payco, started Linco Seed which turned into Heartland Hybrids and was recently sold to 
American Seed, a division of Monsanto.   
4.12 Learning and Experience Effects  
Learning-by-doing leads to improving customer experiences by understanding their needs.  
Learning by doing gives added experience in distribution that can increase a firm’s 
efficiency.  Learning by managing inventory can lead to producing the right blend of safety 
stocks and stock keeping units, as well as, correctly handling units to minimize seed 
becoming obsolete.  The continued learning and experience can lower costs through more 
efficient and effective use of skills, as Arie de Geus stated, “the ability to learn faster than 
your competition maybe the only sustainable competitive advantage.”   
4.13 Capacity Utilization   
Capacity utilization applies to the production and processing of seed products.  At this time, 
CSC is not planning on this activity.  Further evaluation of capacity utilization would be 
needed if CSC would integrate backwards into the industry.   
4.14 Ease of Entry and Exit 
Depending on the degree of integration, the ease of entry or exit is higher the more 
vertically integrated the company.  The lowest barrier is for firms that are reselling 
purchased seed under their own brand.  Brand marketing, production and processing are the 
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next level of entry barrier.  The barrier becomes increasingly higher as more specific assets 
are required to produce and process seed.  Plant breeding, processing, production, and 
brand sales have infrastructure complexity and asset specificity that make barriers even 
higher.  Biotech research, regulatory challenges of a global perspective, patent pending, 
licensing, and marketing biotech products along with the complex structure of the industry 
have very high barriers of entry and exit.  
4.15 The Cost of the Seed Corn Product 
According to Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, the cost of seed corn prior to the biotech era 
includes the research and development, production, and marketing and distribution.  
Research cost depends on the size of program and the type of seed.  Investment in corn 
variety research has been extensive because of the potential return on investment, while 
wheat research is done by public sector, because the return on wheat genetics is lower. 
Corn production cost represents approximately 25 percent of retail prices.  Production cost 
includes seed conditioning and treatment at the rate of 15 percent of retail price.  Finally, 
marketing and distribution costs are around 20 percent of the retail price, and this includes 
advertising, promotion and distribution with transportation, communications, and storage 
and interest costs.  The addition of biotechnology trait license fees results in a pass-through 
expense, while the other costs remain unchanged (see tables 4.12 through 4.15). 
Table 4.12 Cost Prior to Biotech Corn Products 
 Percent Cost per Unit 
Retail Price  $            90.00 
Research and Development 12% $            10.80 
Seed Production 25% $            22.50 
Seed Conditioning 15% $            13.50 
Marketing & Distribution 20% $            18.00 
Overhead and Personnel 13% $            11.70 
Above- Average Profits 15% $            13.50 
Total 100% $            90.00 
 
Source for Table 4.12 to 4.15; Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo; cost were found in “The Seed 
Industry in U.S. Agricultural, An Exploration of Data and Information on Crop Seed 
Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development.
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Table 4.13 Cost of Corn with Roundup Ready® Trait 
 Percent Cost per Unit 
Retail Price  $          114.00 
Research and Development 9% $            10.80 
Biotech Traits 21% $            24.05 
Seed Production 20% $            22.50 
Seed Conditioning 12% $            13.50 
Marketing & Distribution 16% $            18.00 
 Overhead and Personnel 7% $             8.09 
Above- Average Profits 15% $            17.10 
Total 100% $          114.05 
 
Table 4.14 Cost of Seed Corn with YieldGard® Corn Borer and Roundup Ready® 
Traits 
 Percent Cost per Unit 
Retail Price  $          142.00 
Research and Development 8% $            10.80 
Biotech Traits 35% $            49.70 
Seed Production 16% $            22.50 
Seed Conditioning 10% $            13.50 
Marketing & Distribution 13% $            18.00 
 Overhead and Personnel 4% $             6.25 
Above- Average Profits 15% $            21.30 
Total 100% $          142.05 
 
Table 4.15 Cost of Seed Corn with YieldGard® Plus; Corn Borer, Roundup Ready 
and Corn Root Worm Traits 
 Percent Cost per Unit 
Retail Price  $          187.00 
Research and Development 6% $            10.80 
Biotech Traits 47% $            86.96 
Seed Production 12% $            22.50 
Seed Conditioning 7% $            13.50 
Marketing & Distribution 10% $            18.00 
Overhead and Personnel 4% $             6.55 
Above- Average Profits 15% $            28.05 
Total 100% $          186.35 
 
4.16 Industry Profitability 
Of the four major seed companies, only Monsanto is focused in the seed industry.  
DuPont/Pioneer, Dow AgroScience, and Syngenta have other business segments that 
 41 
 
contribute to their financial performance and in most cases the seed business is not the 
major enterprise in the company.  There is more information on these companies in a later 
chapter.  Regional seed companies’ are not public corporations so their financial 
performance is not open to the public.   My experience indicates the regional company may 
be willing to accept a lower return on investment if it meets the needs of other intangible, 
financial, and personal goals.  
Table 4.16 Stock Price and P/E Ration and Dividends 
 Year 
Ago 
4/29/06 
 Month 
12/10/07
Difference 
Gain or 
Loss 
P/E 
Ratio
Dividend 
Yield 
Latest 
Dividend
Dow 
AgroScience 
$40.61 $43.26 $2.65 13.20 3.56% $0.42 
DuPont/Pioneer $44.10 $47.54 $3.44 15.01 2.81% $0.37 
Monsanto $83.40 $98.29 $14.89 35.83 .72% $0.125 
Syngenta $27.78 $50.3 $22.52 40.96 .66% $0.262 
Source: Website for each firm. 
According to the October 2007 Seed World the annual sales needed to have critical mass 
and these numbers are based on assumptions of leaders in the seed industry. 
Table 4.17 Sales for Critical Mass Needs 
Segment Sales to Critical Mass 
Trait Providers $3 billion 
Global Breeders $700 million 
Regional Breeders $40 million 
Distributors $18 million 
Regional Retailers (multi-outlet) $10 million 
Source: Robynne Anderson, Super Sized or Right Size? Seed World, October 2007 
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CHAPTER 5:  FIVE COMPETITIVE FORCES  
 
Michael Porter’s five competitive forces are the underlying economic structure that yields 
the potential profit and long term return of invested capital for the firm.  The interaction of 
these forces will lead to strategies designed by management to allow the firm to defend 
against or influence the industry to favor the CSC market position.  We will evaluate 
strategies of other companies and seek out a competitive advantage for CSC in its proposed 
area of focus. 
The five forces of competition include: 
• Rivalry among competitors 
• Substitute products  
• Potential new entries into the industry 
• Power of the Buyer 
• Power of the Seller 
5.1 Rivalry of Competitors 
Rivalry has become much stronger as the firms try to gain or maintain their market share.  
Factors that lead to intense rivalry include:  numerous competitors in the industry, slow 
growth in the industry, high fixed and/or storage costs, a perceived lack of switching costs, 
diverse competitors, and high exit barriers for some parts or activities of the vertical chain. 
• Numerous competitors create rivalry.  The industry has four major companies and 
approximately 265 regional-sized companies.  
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o The major companies are looking for growth of share in the market and that 
creates rivalry within the industry.  The majors are growing their national 
brands and acquiring regional companies as part of their strategy. 
o Regional companies have generally acted more courteous toward other 
regional companies prior to biotechnology.  Now, in order to maintain one’s 
market share and competitive advantage, rivalry has become more intense. 
• Industry life cycle is mature where the sales are based on the planting decisions of 
the farmer.  The farmers planting decision is based more on the price per bushel 
offered per commodity as compared to other factors.  In 2005, approximately 81 
million acres of corn were planted in the U.S.  In 2006, corn planted acres were 
closer to 78.9 acres.  The year 2007 saw 90.2 million acres planted to corn, but 
when corn increases, soybean acres usually decrease.  In the past, the planted acres 
stay relatively close to the numbers listed above.  To grow, a firm must take sales 
and market share away from another company instead of adding new customers to 
the industry.   
• High fixed and/or storage costs create rivalry action.  Fixed production and storage 
costs provide competitive advantages when a firm has low cost of production and 
the right blend of percentage of stocks keeping units and a high market share. 
o High fixed costs of processing facilities are specific assets: they grade, size, 
treat and package seed corn or soybean seed.  When close to full capacity 
the firm has the opportunity of lowering their costs.  In order to keep a 
lower cost, a company needs to sell off a high percent of SKU’s in order to 
make use of the turn-around of assets.  
o The projection plan of production is to have 130 percent for safety stock and 
stock keeping units; this is needed in order to satisfy customer demand.  
Seed products are produced in the summer for the following spring seeding.  
The life cycle of a genetic product is three to five years.  Finding the right 
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balance of the supplies produced with the demand of customer’s need is 
challenging for all companies.  When stocks are higher, companies in the 
industry may decide to sell off those Stock keeping units by the lowering of 
prices and rivalry actions follow.   
o High stock keeping units use more capital and lower a company’s use of 
capital for other important functions; from a rivalry point of view, firms 
need to turn over inventory which maximizes capital usage.   
o Another factor is that the seed may or may not maintain the quality of 
germination as the unit is held over.  When the unit losses germ, it is thrown 
away and unit costs go up.  Selling the seed before it loses quality, even at a 
reduced amount, may reduce prices and create a rivalry within the industry.   
• There are no switching costs; a seed product from one company can easily replace 
the seed from another company.   
• Diversity of competitors:  Each firm approaches the industry differently based on 
their strategies, origins and personalities.   
o Monsanto is an agricultural company.  Their aggressive company 
personality helped them obtain a leadership position in the industry. They 
were the leader in bringing biotechnology to the market place, first with the 
Roundup Ready® soybeans.  Being a leader has given Monsanto the 
opportunity to gain market share.  Acquisition of Dekalb/Asgrow and the 
development of American Seed have given Monsanto the marketing, sales, 
and logistic activities to provide their products to customers effectively and 
efficiently.  The purchase of Holden’s Foundation Company has given 
Monsanto a great wealth of corn genetics to choose from.   
o Syngenta, a European owned company, is said to take a slightly slower 
approach to the development and marketing of any new technology.  This 
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nature has put them into a follower position.  Their strategy is to provide an 
alternative technology product to the market, and then indicate that their 
service and product is friendlier and provides more choices for the 
customer.  
o DuPont/Pioneer has been a great competitor in genetics and service.  
Biotechnology development has been its Achilles heel.  DuPont/Pioneer’s 
share of the seed corn market has fallen from 45.6 percent in 1995 to 30.5 
percent in 2005, and 25 percent in 2007.  Biotechnology has made the 
difference.  DuPont/Pioneer accesses traits through Monsanto and Dow 
AgroScience.  Although they lost the number one position in the market, 
they are working at regaining their momentum; they recently invested $100 
million dollars in plant breeding.  Also, DuPont/Pioneer has the highest seed 
prices, which is based on past performance history of Pioneer seeds.  In the 
new environment of biotechnology traits, DuPont/Pioneer has lost market 
share with their high priced seeds. 
o Dow AgroScience participates in the market as a trait supplier and retail 
sales under the trade name of Mycogen.  Their technology in corn 
protection from corn borer and rootworm is known by their Herculex trade 
name.  According to a former Mycogen employee, Dow always’ seems to 
be wandering around and then all of the sudden finds a place to exist within 
the market place.  They recently signed an agreement with Monsanto to 
combine traits and cross license genetics, a potential advantage for both 
companies.  
o A minor player in the seed industry is Bayer Crop Science; their version is 
an herbicide tolerant seed plant that uses using Liberty® herbicide.  It was 
the second herbicide tolerant product launched after Roundup Ready®.  
Low market share saturation in corn of Liberty Link® left Bayer to 
concentrate on other business segments and crop opportunities.  Their 
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market share in global cotton is 16 percent and in canola/rapeseed is 19 
percent.  Although Bayer does not sell corn or soybean seed, they are 
important to note within the diversity of competitors because of the 
ownership of the Liberty Link® technology, which is licensed to the major 
and seed regional companies.   
o BASF has an agricultural product division that employs 600 people in plant 
biotechnology.  They have a stake in the market, although their presence in 
the seed industry is based on genetics to the wholesale market (Thurston 
Genetics) and development of biotech traits. 
o Regional seed company owner-operators add a lot of diversity to the 
industry.  Often these independent business people are creative and 
dedicated seeds-men that have spent a lifetime of involvement in the 
industry.  They value personal relationships with their customers, they excel 
at product selection and development and implementation of services that 
meet the need of their customers.  Often they become a local well known 
personality.  They add a dimension of lowering price by the maintaining 
their independence and not always expecting normal or industry rates of 
return on their investment.   
• High exit barriers exist for much of the value chain.  
o Specialized assets of proprietary technology, genetics, production facilities 
and carryover stocks are most useful in the seed industry, but not 
necessarily useful in any other industry. The fixed cost of labor agreement, 
technology agreements, and inventory can create high exit barriers. 
o Another barrier to exiting the industry is strategic interrelationships, where 
vertical integration of a company depends on each division to succeed (such 
as a seed division, herbicide division, and pesticide division) by working 
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together to provide a bundled technology and genetic product to the market.  
When one division fails, it compromises the success of the other divisions. 
o Many owners experience an emotional tie in loyalty to employees and 
customers, as well as pride of ownership.  The identity of ownership can be 
a difficult emotional barrier to overcome.   
5.2 Substitute Products 
In Minnesota, a corn, soybean rotation based on 50 percent corn and 50 percent soybeans is 
standard, expect for wheat to the north and sugar beets to the north and southwest.  The 
base is altered if a farmer grows alfalfa for his/her livestock.  Changes in base acres are 
affected by supply and demand of the respective commodity.  In 2006, 7,700,000 acres of 
corn were planted and 6,900,000 acres of soybeans.  In 2007, corn acres were up by 10 
percent due to a growing export market and demand for corn by ethanol plants.  Soybeans 
were down about 10 percent as a result of corn demand and excessive soybean carryover 
from the previous year.  The risk of losing acres to a real substitute product is very low. 
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Figure 5.1 Planted Substitute Products in Minnesota   
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Source: USDA, NASS, Minnesota State Agricultural Overview - 2006 
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Figure 5.2 Harvested Substitute Products in Minnesota 
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5.3 New Competitors and the Potential Barriers to Entry into the Seed Industry 
Possible barriers to entry are economies of scale, product differentiation, capital 
requirements, switching costs, access to distribution channels, cost disadvantage 
independent of scale, and government policy. Other concerns include the potentially 
aggressive offensive moves of existing competitors which include lawsuits over 
biotechnology, intellectual property rights and plant protection patents, aggressive 
advertising campaigns, and dealing with customer preference and loyalty to an existing 
company.   
In a mature industry, a seed company that desires full integration would have extremely 
high barriers of entry.  Vertically integration might produce high profit, but the risks 
 50 
 
associated are also high.  Monsanto, being first to the market with biotech traits, captured 
market share and high profits.  Monsanto leveraged that leadership position by acquiring 
DeKalb, Asgrow, Holden’s Foundation Co, and 24 regional seed companies.  Monsanto 
expects that position of leverage in products and distribution to propel it to greater market 
share.  Roundup Ready® soybean trait fees was the “cash cow” that provided them with 
the financial resources to acquire the other firms.  The result is that all other highly 
vertically integrated seed companies have lost market share.   
Table 5.1 Monsanto Roundup Ready® Soybean Trait Fee for U.S Market 
Planted Acres Units Roundup Ready 
market share 
usage 
Trait Fee Total Roundup 
Ready Trait Fee 
74,000,000 74,000,000 88% $13.95 $908,424,000 
Source: Planted Acres and market share from USDA, units and fee are assumptions based 
on industry information. 
So, what are the barriers to entry that CSC faces today?  CSC will probably face a lack of 
economies of scale until they build market share high enough to gain a cost advantage.  
CSC product cost per unit is made up of biotech fees, genetics cost of product and royalties.  
Technology licenses from AgroScience , Monsanto, Syngenta, and Bayer can be a barrier if 
the suppliers do not grant a license.  Syngenta’s cost per trait per unit is found in Table 5.2.  
Technology fees apply for each unit sold. Information on Dow AgroScience trait fees is 
similar but gives volume incentives, a cost advantage to large market share holders over 
mid to small regional companies.   
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Table 5.2 AgriSure Trait Fees 
2007 AgriSure CB AgriSure GT AgriSure GT/CB 
AgriSure Trait Fee $25.00 $27.00 $52.00 
Advantage Rewards 
(grower and 
reporting rewards) 
-$12.00 -$6.00 -$25.00 
Net Due $13.00 $21.00 $27.00 
Source: Conversations with industry professionals. 
CSC will purchase genetics products through the wholesale market.  Average purchase 
price of genetics products are between $34.00 and $40.00 dollars per unit.  Large volume 
purchases can reduce the cost up to $6.00 per unit.  CSC will probably not qualify for 
discounted costs, due to low volume.  Another part of seed unit cost is genetic royalties 
(Table 5.3).   
Table 5.3 Syngenta Royalty per Unit Cost 
 Base x Two Syngenta Trait Non-Syngenta Total Royalty 
Conventional   $    4.00   $    $           8.00  
Liberty Link  $    4.00   $             5.00    $           9.00  
Agrisure CB or GT  $    4.00   $             6.00    $         10.00  
A non-Syngenta  $    4.00   $             4.00   $            5.00   $         13.00  
Source: Conversations with industry professionals. 
Products are made up of biotechnology traits and traditional genetics.  Trait and genetic 
products require licenses to market the product.  Can CSC obtain the right licenses for the 
right products for their geographic area?  I they can, is there product differentiation?  
Monsanto licenses their traits to many seed companies.  New entrants need enough volume 
or a personal connection to obtain the license from Monsanto.  Roundup Ready® and 
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YieldGard® traits are leading the market Monsanto can be very selective when choosing 
who to license.  Monsanto owns Holden Foundation Company that provides genetics to the 
market place through the wholesale market.  A license is required to purchase and sell those 
hybrids. 
Syngenta licenses their technology traits to others in the same manner as Monsanto.  
Recently Syngenta formed Greenleaf Genetics, which offers Syngenta genetics and traits to 
the market place.  DuPont/Pioneer recently acquired a 50 percent share of Greenleaf and is 
offering those genetics to the wholes market.  Due to shrinking market share, Syngenta is 
more open to signing an agreement with new entrants to the industry.  
Dow AgroScience licenses its traits to many other seed companies, and also cross licenses 
with Monsanto to make available traits of both companies.  Dow AgroScience recently 
agreement with Monsanto to cross license traits will form the first eight trait stack as found 
on Dow AgroScience website.   
Bayer Crop Science Liberty Link® license restriction is the firm must sell over 500 units of 
a Liberty Link corn product.  They broadly license the trait and require no fee.  Their 
pricing strategy is based on the sale of the patent protected herbicide product.  
CSC product cost per unit is made up of biotech fees, genetics cost of product, and 
royalties. Technology licenses from Dow AgroScience, Monsanto, Syngenta and Bayer can 
be a barrier if the suppliers do not grant a license.   
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Table 5.4 Ownership of Genetic Suppliers 
Ownership Genetic Suppliers 
Monsanto Holden’s Foundation Company 
Syngenta  & 
DuPont/Pioneer  
Greenleaf Genetics, a 50 % split 
Private 
BASF 
Private 
Seed Genetic, Inc. 
Thruston Genetics, In. 
Mike Brayton Seed (MBS) 
 
The listing of trait ownership of the four main biotechnology providers is shown in table 
5.5 below. 
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Table 5.5 Technology Ownership 
Companies Monsanto Syngenta Dow 
AgroScience 
Bayer 
Herbicides Roundup 
Ready/NK 603 
Roundup 
Ready/GA21 
 Liberty/TC25
Corn Borer YieldGard/Mon810 YieldGard/Bt11 Herculex 1.1  
Corn Root 
Worm 
CRW Agrisure CRW 
MIR 604 
Herculex Xtra  
Stacked YG/RR 
CRW/RR 
YG/CRW/RR 
VT3 
YG/Bt11/Liberty 
YG/Bt11/LL/RR 
Hx 1.1/Liberty  
Source: Conversation with industry professionals. 
Corn and soybean products in a highly vertically integrated company have exclusive or 
proprietary products.  Corn and soybean products offered by CSC may include products 
that are totally different, the same as, or a close family member to or just slightly different 
than the competitor’s corn and soybean product.   
The capital required to start CSC would have to be discovered in the financial analysis 
section that will come after the market study.   
There is no inerrant cost of switching products in the seed industry.  Seed products can be 
switched easily from one planter to the next.  This would not be a barrier of entry for the 
seed industry. 
The two most common retail channels of distribution are in combination of a company’s 
direct sale to customers, and by setting up farmer to be reselling dealers, or reselling 
through a retail supply store.  Direct selling and managing a dealer force would need to be 
developed or to find a district sales manager that has a loyal following of customers.  My 
observation is that about 50 percent of the customer base follows the DSM and on the 
strength of the DSM or lack of service by the company, that percentage can be higher.  
Retail supply stores provide great access to the customer due to location and the bundling 
of other input products being sold and the service they provide.  Large companies have 
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used this system to access customers, and new entries would have to compete for shelf 
space.   
CSC would face a major cost disadvantage with the proprietary products of biotechnology, 
which is owned by Monsanto, Dow AgroScience, and Syngenta.  The cost of Syngenta 
traits as seen in Table 5.2 creates a cost disadvantage due to the trait fee that applies to each 
unit sold. 
Government policy issues are a minor concern for CSC.  Changes in the Farm Bill could 
add planted acres in the U.S. if CRP ground is released.  Other issues are if compliance of 
the refuge program is not met, biotech traits may become unapproved and taken off the 
market.  Biotech products must meet approval by the USDA in order to be marketed in the 
United States and other consuming nations.   
Due to intellectual property rights and plant protection patent products, and traits are 
protected for the originating firm.  These firms can select who they are willing to work 
with, usually economies of scale plays a part of the decisions in these cases 
5.4 Power of the Buyer 
Seed buyers are price sensitive.  They expect seed products to have great yield potential 
and that a seed company’s service is relevant to their needs.  The combination of price, 
product, and service constitutes value to the customer.  Pioneer has positioned themselves 
as the leader in all three categories of value, yet the market share shift indicates that value 
is not being received by buyers of Pioneer, and growers are purchasing more 
Dekalb/Asgrow and regional companies product based on performance and/or pricing.  A 
Merrill Lynch company update document shows the differences in product performance of 
Dekalb and ASI companies compared to Pioneer and Syngenta (table 5.3). 
 56 
 
Figure 5.3 Yield Differences that have led to changing market share     
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Source: Don Carson, Field Trials Highlight Monsanto’s Yield Advantage. In a Merrill 
Lynch Industry Overview on November 2, 2007 
Syngenta’s slide in market share indicates that their value proposition of retail price, 
product performance and service doesn’t match the perceived value that of Dekalb/Asgrow 
or regional companies.  Dow AgroScience small market share does give indication of how 
their value is perceived.     
The seed buyer has three components to consider: yield, costs, and price of the commodity. 
The seed product is one of the major production costs, along with land, machinery, and 
fertilizer costs.  Genetics and biotech traits have increased corn and soybean yields.  Costs 
have also risen.  The price of the commodity becomes a significant factor in buyer’s price 
sensitivity for input costs.  When there is low commodity prices, farmers are more price 
sensitive than when price of commodities are higher. Seed and chemical costs rose 8 
percent from 2000 to 2005 while yields were up 9 percent. 
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Table 5.6 Yield Performance and Seed Cost for Corn of 2000 to 2005 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Yield per acre 148 151 142 157 178 161 
Price per bushel $1.75 $1.80 $2.30 $2.10 $2.10 $1.77 
Gross Volume per acre $259.36 $273.17 $327.93 $331.06 $376.17 $286.30
Seed Cost per acre $30.64 $33.00 $31.60 $34.89 $37.05 $39.72 
Chemical cost per acre $30.51 $26.67 $26.22 $26.50 $27.11 $27.18 
Total Seed and 
Chemical cost per acre 
$61.15 $59.67 $57.82 $61.39 $64.16 $66.90 
 
Soybean yields have increased about 8 percent from 2000 to 2005 and seed and chemical 
cost has risen 12 percent.  There is more price sensitivity when price per bushel is lower 
than when price is higher. 
Table 5.7 Yield Performance and Seed Cost for Soybeans of 2000 to 2005 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Yield per acre 45 46 44 36 49 49 
Price per bushel $4.44 $4.16 $5.23 $6.57 $5.58 $5.70 
Gross Volume per acre $199.80 $189.78 $228.34 $237.02 $272.08 $282.09
Seed Cost per acre $18.30 $21.72 $23.01 $27.78 $29.56 $32.50 
Chemical cost per acre $22.58 $22.82 $22.73 $17.40 $16.61 $14.00 
Total Seed and Chemical 
cost per acre 
$40.88 $44.54 $45.74 $45.18 $46.17 $46.50 
Source for Table 5.6 and 5.7 is www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Minnesota 
One reason farmers may lack power is due to the high financial requirements, skill level, 
and the agreements/connections needed to backward integration into the seed industry.     
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5.5 Power of the Seller 
There are three segments of sellers within in the seed industry; biotech traits suppliers, 
genetic suppliers, and companies that provide seed product to the farmer.  The most 
powerful seller is the trait supplier.  Monsanto, Syngenta, and Dow AgroScience are trait 
suppliers.  Roundup Ready® soybeans and corn, along with Liberty Link® corn is 
herbicide tolerant seed products that provides crop safety and a greater window of 
application which allows farmers a management tool that can grow there business with 
economies of scale.  Corn borer and corn root worm resistance traits are substitutes to 
insecticides, traits are easier to use and more effective in performance.  
Table 5.8 Cost of Traits verse Insecticide per Acre 
Biotech Treatment Price per Acre Insecticide Treatment Price per Acre 
Roundup Ready® $10.80 Lower chemical cost  
Corn borer $10.00 One pass $16.00 
Corn root worm $18.00 Regent® $16.00 
Triple Stack $38.80 All of the above $32.00 
Source:  Based on personal experience and the writers assumptions of cost per acre for both 
biotech and insecticide. 
Genetic supplier’s power is not as great due to more competition in supplying genetics to 
the industry.  Table 5.4 shows genetic suppliers; most genetic firms are open to work with 
seed companies through a licensing agreement.  Holden’s Foundation Company is the most 
restrictive in setting up new license agreements with others; as it stands now Holden’s 
works with Dekalb/Asgrow, American Seed and regional companies called seed partners.      
Companies that provide seed products to farmers have the least power among the sellers.  
They access traits and genetics from more powerful sellers than themselves and the buyer 
is price sensitive as they seek to balance product performance with price.  There is a need 
by the farmer to have seed for planting and this gives the seller power, there is no substitute 
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product to replace seed.  Government patent rights benefit the seller by protecting or 
restricting the use of homegrown seed from being planted and harvested.   
Monsanto’s products have achieved market penetration with Roundup Ready® soybeans at 
88 percent and YieldGard® corn borer and corn root worm traits.  Does their seller power 
allow them to affect a higher industry retail price, lower their supply costs through 
economies of scale and thereby undermine their competition?  Do they have market power?   
In conclusion to Chapter 5, an ideal environment of the industry is that the buyers and 
suppliers are weak, there are no good substitutes, entry barriers are relatively high and the 
there is only moderate rivalry among competitors.  The seed industry shows buyer and 
supplier strength, no good substitutes, with entry costs varying according to vertical 
integration and intense rivalry for market share. 
Table 5.9 Five Forces of an Ideal Environment and Seed Industry 
Five Forces Ideal Environment Seed Industry 
Rivalry Moderate Strong 
Substitutes None None 
New Competitors Entry barriers are high Deferring degrees of entry 
barriers depending on 
vertical integration 
Buyer Power Weak Strong 
Seller Power Weak Strong 
 Source: Thompson and Strickland. 
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CHAPTER 6:  WHAT IS CAUSING THE INDUSTRY TO CHANGE? 
 
Four driving forces in the seed industry produce a change in the competitive structure and 
business environment; long-term growth rate, product innovation, distribution changes, and 
entry or exist of major firms into the seed industry. 
6.1 Lack of Long Term Growth Rate 
Because the seed industry is mature, there is intense positioning among firms for 
maintaining or gaining market share, especially since the time of introduction of 
biotechnology trait products.    
6.2 Product Innovation 
Genetic product comes from plant breeding.  According to Kenneth Frey of Iowa State 
University in 1995 prior to the advent of biotechnology, there were 545 breeders for field 
corn in the public sector and private industry.  Soybeans had 156 breeders.  Private industry 
spent $338 million while the public sector spent $213 million.   
Table 6.1 1996 and 2006 Seed Research and Development  
Company Research and 
Development 
Annual 
Revenue 
R & D share of Revenue 
Syngenta 1996 
2006 
$122 
$232 
$970 
$1,743 
12.6% 
13.3% 
DuPont/Pioneer 1996 $133 
$567 
$1,600 
$6,008 
8.3% 
9.4% 
Monsanto (1996) 
2006 
$41 
$1,021 
$387 
$7,294 
10.6% 
14% 
Source: Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo,  The Seed Industry in U.S. Agricultural, An Exploration 
of Data and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and 
Research and Development.   www.ers.usda.gov.  And 2006 Financials of each firm.  
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Figure 6.1 Gains Made in Corn Yields per Acre  
Actual Breeding Plus Cultural Practice Gain 
 
Source of information: Crop Science. Reference # 46-528-543.  March 2006 
Traditional corn plant breeding takes seven generation of crossing phenotypic selection to 
create a 99.2 percent pure inbred.  From there, new germ-plasm was crossed to another 
inbred in order to make a commercial product.  Today with Double Haploid method of 
crossing, inbreds are 100 percent pure in two generations.  Along with maker-assisted 
selection, germ-plasm to products is further accelerated.  Another stage of research and 
development is genomics technology assisted selection which takes germ-plasm to finished 
product.  These methods speed genetic performance improvements for farmers.  Due to the 
learning curve of the industry most of the major genetics firms have developed this type of 
breeding program.  Don Carlson of Merrill Lynch states, “As Monsanto ramps up its 
molecular breeding capabilities in soybeans and Pioneer in corn, we expect these 
performance gaps to eventually narrow.  Smaller independent seed companies with limited 
R & D budgets will in our view continue to lose share.” 
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
or
n 
Yi
el
ds
 (
kg
/h
a)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
or
n 
Yi
el
ds
 (
bu
/a
c)
Double Cross
b=63.1/1.01
Open Pollinated
b=1.0/0.02
Single Cross
b=113.2/1.81
Biotech 
b=194.7/3.11
 62 
 
Figure 6.2 Soybeans Yields per Acre 
Soybean Yields
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Source: www.nass.usda.gov 
Table 5.5 explains the ownership of traits that are substitute for insecticides and tolerance 
to herbicides, these traits combined with the right genetics have provides farmers with seed 
products that have increased yields by reducing stress of disease, insect damage, and safety 
of herbicide applications.  Market share for corn traits have increased from 44 to 73 percent 
(Table 4.10) and soybeans traits have increased 71 to 88 percent (Table 4.9).  Trait 
acceptance has shown value to the farmer.  The pipeline of new traits coming in the next 
years will continue to differentiate products in the future.   
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Table 6.2 Trait Pipeline for the Near Future 
Input Traits Monsanto Syngenta DuPont/Pioneer 
Herbicide Tolerance 2nd generation of 
herbicide tolerance 
Optimum GAT™ Optimum GAT™ 
and Triple-Mod 
Herbicide Tolerance 
Insect Resistance 2nd generation of 
Insect resistance 
  
Disease Resistance   Anthracnose Stalk 
Rot 
Other Higher Yield 
Drought Tolerance 
GT/CRW/ECB  
Output Traits    
Feed High value with 
lysine 
 Improved Feed II 
Bio-Based Fuels  Corn amylase  
Source:  Each firms website. 
For regional brands, product differentiation can be more apparent than real.  The wholesale 
market provides a wide range of genetic products for regional companies to select from.  
Products may be all together different genetic package, a sister inbred line or the same 
genetic package as another firm in the industry.  So, differentiating products is based on 
branding of product and service that creates value to the farmer and build brand image for 
the company.   
Performance of products have become more consistent and higher yielding, even to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Crop Insurance Industry, who has accepted the performance data 
from Monsanto and are going to reduce premiums for farmers who use 75 to 80 percent  
seed from genetic and triple stack traits by Monsanto. 
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6.3 Process or Distribution Innovation 
Two changes were happening in the agricultural industry as biotech was being accepted.  
Farmers who adopted biotech were able to grow in size due to the convenience of trait 
products.  As farmers became bigger they demand more agronomic service from their seed 
suppliers.  The distribution channels is the lifeline to the customer, and the company who 
owns the best system is growing market share and controlling delivery of traits to the 
market.  As an example of this, Dow AgroScience recently signed an agreement with 
Monsanto to combine the traits of the two companies in order to offer the first eight stack 
trait product.  At 3% of corn market share Dow opened their traits to a greater share of the 
market than when they were working with DuPont/Pioneer.   
 Monsanto has acquired multiple distribution channels.  Their national brand of 
Dekalb/Asgrow distribute products by branding and promotion through fertilizer coops 
throughout the nation.  They also have some dealer presence for their retail brand. A 
division of Monsanto is American Seed which was developed to acquire regional 
companies; there are 24 companies to date.  Their sales are to become the relational 
marketing approach with sales people using high-touch persuasion and consultations to 
build relations.  Monsanto also sells genetics through Holden’s Foundation Company, and 
licenses their traits to numerous seed companies.   
In response or at the same time, Syngenta acquired Golden Harvest and Garst; 4 and 4.5 
percent market share respectively.  Insiders in the industry felt that the purchase was more 
for their genetic breeding programs than market share, an effort to develop a higher 
performing product.  In 2006, they reconfigured their distribution with NK being their 
national brand sold at cooperatives, Garst being a direct sale model with company sales 
persons and Golden Harvest managing a farmer-dealer network system.  Their next 
distribution was in the wholesale market with Greenleaf Genetics.  They license their traits 
to multiple firms as well.   
DuPont/Pioneer was a heavy user of the farmer dealer until farmers started to demand 
greater service.  They responded by placing a more professional force in the market, fewer 
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and farther apart.  After Greenleaf Genetics was a year old, Pioneer acquired a 50% share 
of the company.  This represents the first time Pioneer genetics would be available in the 
wholesale market.   
Regional firms’ distribution, for the most part, is based on relationship selling where long 
term customer relationships are built through personal contact.      
6.4 Entry and or Exit of Major Firms 
Since 1996 there have been numerous acquisitions in the seed industry.  Positioning for 
leadership in traits and genetics has caused changes in market share.  Monsanto has become 
the share leader in both genetics and traits; Monsanto’s acquisitions gave it access to 
genetics, traits and distribution.  The acquisition strategy has strengthened Monsanto’s 
market position.  
DuPont’s acquisition of Pioneer does not look like it has paid off at this time.  They lack 
true ownership of a proprietary trait and their genetics performance of late has caused them 
to lose market share.  Their earning and EBIT for the agricultural segment still supports 
them being in the industry, but further erosion of market share may cause DuPont to 
reconsider its purchase.  
Syngenta in an offensive move acquired Garst and Golden Harvest for market share and 
their genetic breeding programs.  To date the acquisition has not resulted in a gain in 
market share.       
Dow AgroScience is second in trait leadership with their Herculex I brand and have three 
percent of the corn market share.  They recently signed an agreement with Monsanto to 
combine traits and to exchange germplasm.  Their earning and EBIT seems to support their 
involvement in the industry, but with 3 percent of the market, do they have enough share to 
with stand stress?   
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Table 6.3 Entry of Major Firms into the Seed Industry 
Company Companies Acquired 
(Year) 
Purchase Price 
Syngenta Golden Harvest (2004) 
Garst (2004) 
$180 million 
$EUR239 million 
DuPont Pioneer (1999) $9.4 billion 
Monsanto Asgrow (1997) 
Holden’s Foundation Co. 
(1997) 
Dekalb (1998) 
$ .22 billion 
$1.2 billion 
$3.7 billion 
Source: For Syngenta, www.seedquest.com. and Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed 
Industry in U.S. Agriculture, AIB Number 786.  
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CHAPTER 7:  WHICH COMPANIES ARE IN THE STRONGEST AND 
WEAKEST POSITIONS? 
 
In regards to the strongest and weakest position, I am using the ability of a company to 
have true product innovation and vertical integration that allows for process and 
distribution innovation. These two factors have led to positions of strength for Monsanto 
and apparent weakness to other major companies.   
For purposes of strategic grouping in the seed industry and looking at product innovation 
and vertical integration, I would choose to map out technology leadership (products) and 
vertical integration (process) for this map that gives us a picture of what the industry looks 
like and how is competing for each of strategy grouping.   
7.1 Strategic Group 1: Large Global Firms  
Firms: BASF, Bayer Crop Science, Dow AgroScience, DuPont/Pioneer, Monsanto, and 
Syngenta 
Technology and product leadership: This group has developed trait products that are in the 
market place.  This group may or may not conduct corn and soybean breeding in order to 
bring forth seed products.    
Degree of vertical integration: Research and development of biotechnology traits and 
breeding of plants. They produce and process their seed; they market through both their 
branded business and the wholesale market.  They setup retail market sales along with 
maintaining a service component for the customer. 
7.2 Strategic Group 2: Large Firms with Research/ Development and 
Production/Processing 
Firms: Dairyland Seed, AgReliant Genetics, and Pannar Seed Company   
Technology and product leadership: This group conducts corn and soybean breeding in 
order to bring forth seed products.    
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Degree of vertical integration: They have an emphasis on research of genetics, but may 
purchase some varieties on the wholesale market.  They market both by retail and through 
system of wholesale of genetics, they produce and process their own seed, along with 
managing their own marketing and sales and service. 
7.3 Strategic Group 3: Regional Firms with Production/Processing 
Firms: Beck, Hogameyer, Producers, Anderson’s, Brown’s, Kaltenberg, Dahlco, Dallman, 
Johnson’s and Renk’s. 
Technology and product leadership: This group will probably continue to access corn and 
soybean breeding stock from other breeder in order to bring forth seed products. They don’t 
use resources to develop traits.    
Degree of vertical integration: They may have genetics program, they have production and 
processing of seed, they have a retail marketing program that supports sales and service of 
their product lineup.   
7.4 Strategic Group 4: Regional Firms with Full Service 
Firms: Land o’ Lakes (Croplan Genetics), Hefty 
Technology and product leadership: This group will probably continues to access corn and 
soybean breeding stock from other breeders in order to bring forth seed products. They 
don’t use resources to develop traits.    
 Degree of vertical integration: This group markets their own retail corn, soybeans and 
alfalfa along with being the distribution for many our brands.  Their marketing and sales is 
complimented by bundling of other products, such as fertilizer and chemicals; that is 
carried out by many locations that service smaller localized areas. 
7.5 Strategic Group 5: Regional Companies 
Firms: AgVentures, Sabre, Mid-West Genetics, Albert Lea Seed House, Legend 
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 Technology and product leadership: This group will probably continue to access corn and 
soybean breeding stock from other breeders in order to bring forth seed products. They 
don’t use resources to develop traits.    
Degree of vertical integration: Their focused activity is marketing and sales of their 
branded seed along with individual service they provide for their customers. 
7.6 Strategic Group 6: Production/Processors 
Firms: Remington and Gro-alliance 
Technology and product leadership: This group will probably continue to access corn and 
soybean breeding stock from other breeders in order to bring forth seed products. They 
don’t use resources to develop traits.    
Degree of vertical integration: Their focused activity is on the production and processing 
of seed for others. 
7.7 Strategic Group 7: Genetic Suppliers 
Firms: Seed Genetics, Thurston Genetics, and MBS   
Technology and product leadership: This group works with multiple breeders of corn and 
soybeans and then market genetics into the wholesale supply chain.  
Degree of vertical integration: Supplier of genetics to the wholesale market. 
What can be learned from a strategic map of the seed industry has we place two key 
success factors and shows the strength of firms with biotech and genetic research and 
development programs.  These firms become gatekeepers to the industry, because of the 
high usage by customers of biotech traits.  Access to genetics that have high performance 
may also become an ever increasing concern as Holden’s fills Monsanto seed needs first 
and Greenleaf Genetics takes care of Syngenta and Pioneers seed needs.  
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Sygenta’s nine percent market share and Dow AgroScience three percent of market share 
are lower and does provide the industry with some competitive forces that may open 
opportunities for regional companies to have traits and genetics.    
Regional firms will need to continue to find synergies and alliances with genetic and 
biotech trait suppliers as well as with production and processing firms.  The development 
of a loyal customer base, in order to protect market share, will increasing become critical to 
maintaining those alliances.   
Medium size research and development firms may be challenged in maintaining quality of 
performance from their genetics as large programs increase genetic performance.  
Production and processing can survive with reasonable returns, but shifts in market share to 
large companies may pressure their capacity.  Marketing companies will need to build a 
loyal customer base and differentiate themselves so to maintain a reasonable rate of return.    
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Figure 7.1 Strategic Map of the Seed Industry 
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CHAPTER 8:  WHAT STRATEGIC MOVES ARE RIVALS LIKELY TO MAKE 
NEXT? 
 
Trying to predict the moves of other companies is a challenging task, but necessary in 
understanding the industry as a whole.  These potential moves may help us position our self 
to maximize opportunities that may become available. 
This chapter will focus on BASF, Bayer CropScience, Dow AgroScience,  DuPont/Pioneer, 
Monsanto and Syngenta.  Also, one global company and one regional company will be 
analyzed for a strategic perspective. 
The format is from Strategic Management by Thompson and Strickland, Table 3.3 entitled 
“Profiling the Objectives and Strategies of Competitors”.   
8.1 BASF 
BASF has a diverse mix of subsidiaries that include chemicals, polymers, automotive and 
industrial coatings, colorants, and agricultural products.   
Competitive scope – BASF is a global company.  Their sales of agricultural products for 
2006 equaled EUR 3.1 billion and EBIT of EUR 460. 
Figure 8.1 BASF Global Market  
Percentage of sales by geographic regions
NAFTA
29%
South America
17%
Asia
9%
Europe
45%
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Figure 8.2 BASF Business Segments 
Percentage attributed to business segments
Insecticides & Others
23%
Fungicides
38%
Herbicides
39%
 
Source: BASF website 
Strategic intent - BASF intent to be a world leader in providing products that improve 
nutrition and quality of life through innovative products and has a strong research and 
development program.  BASF announced on March 21, 2007, an agreement with Monsanto 
for a long range joint research and development and commercialization collaboration for 
biotechnology, using BASF strength in research and Monsanto’s distribution channels.   
Market share objective - Expand their share through innovative development of fungicides 
and insecticides.  Maintain their seed presence. 
Competitive position – Currently maintaining agricultural research and finding distribution 
for potential products.  
Strategic posture – BASF is offensive in their approach based on expenditures in research 
and development. 
Competitive strategy - Differentiation of product, technology superiority, image and brand 
reputation. 
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8.2 Bayer CropScience 
Their main participation in the seed industry is with cotton, canola and rice.  They do offer 
herbicides, insecticides, fungicide, and seed treatment for corn and soybean crops. 
Competitive scope - A global company, its percent of business in the US is 25.6 percent 
with sales of EUR 5,700 million and EBIT of EUR 584 million.  
Figure 8.3 Bayer Crop Science Business Segments 
Percent of Sales by business
BioScience
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Environmental Science
13%
Crop Protection
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Figure 8.4 Bayer Crop Science Global Markets 
 
Percentage of sales by geographic regions
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Source: Bayer website. 
Strategic intent - Maintain its leadership position for crop protection through innovative 
and high margin products.  There is no change in their corn seed platform, it is based on 
technology of the Liberty Link where they charge nothing for a tech fee, but reap the profit 
from the sale of the Liberty herbicide.  They are introducing Liberty Link Soybeans with 
hopes to launch in 2009.  
Market share objective – They want to increase their leadership role in the products they 
market.  Their research and development of products cost $625 million yearly, improved 
product performance is how they are planning to grow their global and US business.  
Competitive position - they are global leaders in insecticides and seed treatment, with a 
strong presence in herbicides.  They will continue to find complementary products that 
support crop protection, bioscience and environmental science. 
Strategic posture - They use both offensive moves such as this new product launch of 
Liberty Link soybean and defensive postures such as protecting their proprietary products.   
Competitive strategy - Pursue differentiation based on quality, service, technology superior 
and image and brand reputation. 
8.3 Dow AgroScience 
They manufacture chemicals and plastics along with biotechnology of crops.  Mycogen is 
their brand for selling seed products. 
Competitive scope - They participate in the global industry.  Dow AgroScience is a $3.5 
billion dollar company with a total EBIT of $3,206 million and the agricultural science 
segment totaling $377 million. 
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Figure 8.5 Dow AgroScience Global Markets 
Percentage of sales by geographic regions
India, Middle East and Africa
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Figure 8.6 Dow AgroScience Business Segments 
 
Dow Chemical Company and Subsidiaries by percent of EBIT by operating segments
Basic Chemicals
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Basic Plastics
28%
Agricultural Science
11%
Performance Chemicals
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Performance Plastics
31%
 
Source: Dow AgroScience website. 
Strategic intent – is to be a top tier agricultural company with innovative crop protection, 
seed, biotechnology traits and pest and vegetation management. 
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Market share objective – is to maintain and grow the seed and biotechnology divisions.  
Competitive position - Retrenching their seed and biotechnology businesses to better 
defend and expand their market share.  They had an arrangement with DuPont/Pioneer in 
offering their biotechnology trait of Herculex®, but with Pioneer losing market share from 
44 percent to 25 percent, they have moved to a new agreement with Monsanto to exchange 
genetic material and join traits in order to expand their trait market share.   
Strategic posture - Recent offensive move to change the marketing of their traits through 
another distribution channel with Monsanto.  This is a defensive move as they seek to build 
interrelationships with others and increase their potential trait market share of Hx1®.  Dow 
AgroScience as recently signed an agreement to work with Monsanto to combine the 
YieldGard® traits with Herculex 1® traits creating a trademark of SmartStac™.   
Competitive strategy - Differentiation is their strategy, their advantage is based on 
technology products. 
8.4 DuPont/Pioneer 
DuPont is a science company and they operate in food and nutrition, health care, apparel, 
home and construction, electronics and transportation.   
Competitive scope - DuPont/Pioneer’s competitive scope is global.  Net sales of $27,421 
million, with the Agricultural & Nutritional segment selling $6,008 million.  EBIT for the 
Agricultural and Nutritional segment is $725 million. 
Figure 8.7 DuPont/Pioneer Global Markets  
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Percentage of business by region
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Figure 8.8 DuPont/Pioneer Business Segments  
 
Percentage attributed to the business divisions
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Source: DuPont/Pioneer website. 
Strategic intent - “Our vision is to be the world’s most dynamic science company, creating 
sustainable solutions essential to a better, safer, healthier life for people everywhere.”   
www.2dupont.com  To be a dominant leader. 
 79 
 
Market share objective - Aggressively hold on to their present market share and work 
towards regaining their number one position. 
Competitive position - Intentions are to grow by putting science to work, go where the 
growth is and take advantage of the power of DuPont. 
Strategic posture - Defensive due to lost market share.  They have showed the industry that 
they can expect price retaliation, if another company tries to win business away from them.  
Their offensive moves include increased spending by $100 million on research and 
development for biotechnology and reducing operating costs in crop protection and 
nutrition by that same amount.  Also, they are reconfiguring their business through 
coalitions with Syngenta to offer genetics the wholesale market via Greenleaf Genetics.   
Competitive strategy - Differentiation based on genetic performance, service of products 
and image and brand reputation. 
8.5 Monsanto 
Monsanto is an agricultural company with biotechnology, chemicals, and seed products in 
their product lineup. 
Competitive scope – Global, Monsanto sells in North America, Europe and Africa, Asia 
Pacific and Latin America.  Total sales equal $7,344 million with an EBIT of $1,095 
million. 
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Figure 8.9 Monsanto Business Segments  
Percentage attributed to business segments
Seed
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Figure 8.10 Monsanto Crop Segments  
Percentage of sales to crop segment
Other crop seeds and traits
18%
Vegatable and Fruit
14%
Soybeans
24%
Corn
44%
 
Source: Monsanto’s website. 
Strategic intent – Is to be the leader in the industry with traits and genetic products. 
Market share objective – Is to aggressively increase share by acquisition and internal 
growth. 
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Competitive position - Growing stronger.  Monsanto was first to the market for 
biotechnology products.  They captured market share and high profits and they leveraged 
that position by acquiring DeKalb, Asgrow, Holden’s Foundation Co and 24 regional seed 
companies.  They expect that leadership position of products and distribution to propel 
them to greater market share.   
Strategic posture - Has the ability to have a sustainable competitive advantage, based on 
offensive moves of product and marketing changes.  Defensive moves employed include 
tie up of sellers, raising competitor input cost of trait fees, and forming coalitions with Dow 
AgroScience to raise barriers or challenges for others. 
Competitive strategy - Based on differentiation that combines technology and genetic 
quality that equals value for the customer, and brand image and reputation. 
8.6 Syngenta 
Their product lineup includes crop protection and seeds.   
Competitive scope is global.  In 2006, Syngenta had sales of $8,046 million dollars with 
and EBIT of $1,535 for all segments of the business, seed generated $158 million towards 
the EBIT. 
Figure 8.11 Syngenta Global Markets  
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Percentage of seed business by region
Asia Pacific
6%
Latin America
6%
NAFTA
48%
Europe, Africa and Middle 
East
40%
 
Figure 8.12 Syngenta Business Segments 
Percentage of business by segments
Seeds
21%
Crop Protection
79%
 
Source: Syngenta’s website. 
Strategic intent – Is to be a world leader in providing innovative solutions to growers of 
food and the feed chain. 
Market share objective - Growth through acquisition of Golden Harvest and Garst and the 
development of Greenleaf Genetics. 
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Competitive position – Is to be a major player in providing inputs for the agricultural 
industry. 
Strategic posture – Is to reconfigure business by acquisition, changing marketing structure, 
and operational changes.   
Competitive strategy - Differentiation based on product differences of genetics and traits, 
and image and reputation. 
8.7 AgReliant Genetics 
AgReliant Genetics in a French-owned company that has acquired Producers Hybrid, 
Wensmans Seed Company, LG Seeds, Great Lakes Hybrids and AgriGold Seed Company. 
Competitive scope - Global with ownership base in France and Germany, along with 
research in North America, Puerto Rico, Chile, and Argentina. 
Strategic intent – Is to increase their rank by acquisition and more recently by internal 
growth.  Between Wensman and Producers, they have 36 salesmen in Minnesota, North 
and South Dakota.  They state that they are number four for market share in the seed 
industry.   
Market share objective – Is to increase market share by acquisition of the above companies 
for the distribution of products. 
Competitive position - Well entrenched with genetic research and development keeping 
them free to use their own genetics, along with local brand names and a loyal customer 
base. 
Strategic posture – is mostly offensive through acquisition. 
Competitive strategy - Differentiation, with genetic differences combined with superior 
services. 
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8.8 Legend Seed Company 
Legend has its origins in DeSmet, South Dakota. 
Competitive scope – Is as a regional seed company. 
Strategic intent - Using sales growth to build their seed business.  
Market share objective – Is to expand business with internal growth.  They employ 18 
salesmen in the upper four state areas. 
Competitive position – Their corn and soybean market share provides them a well 
entrenched position. 
Strategic posture - Risk taker.  
Competitive strategy – Legend says they are different based on customer service, superior 
products and creating value. 
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CHAPTER 9:  THE KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS AND CONCLUSION 
 
It has been said that great questions leads to great answers and the answers, the following 
four question lead to what are the key factors for success.  (Thompson and Strickland, 
“Strategic Management.”) 
How do customers select seed products?   
Farmer selects products based on:  
• Product performance where data may come from University testing programs, third 
party trials, farmer run plots, and company generated plots. 
• Expectation of higher yields when adopting biotech products. 
• Value of the product, based on performance and service in relationship to price. 
• Convenience for help in managing their time that allows for simplicity and 
flexibility of pesticide or herbicide application.   
• The safety of the products being purchased for plant, people, and environment.  
• The reputation of the company selling the product. 
• A relationship with the person selling the product. 
• The cost of the product. 
The intangible art of a sale is to look at buyer type.  Are they a business type buyer where 
they weigh all factors equally?  Are they an economic buyer that purchases on cost?  Are 
they a relational buyer where service and convenience is most important?  Here is an 
overall view of buying behavior criteria. 
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Figure 9.1 Buying Behaviors    
Buying Behavior Segments for Crops & Livestock
Convenience
14%
Price
18%
Performance
16%
Balance
35%
Service
17%
 
Source: Purdue University Center for Food and Agricultural Business 
What characteristics of the products are most important?   
According to Ohio State Extension a farmer should select corn based on relative maturity, 
yield, stand-ability, and resistance to disease.  Penn State suggests relative maturity, disease 
resistance, stand-ability, and yield as the criteria to select corn products.  It has been my 
experience that farmers select products based on yield, stand-ability, and dry down.  
Disease resistance is important, but if the corn yields and the plant stand until harvest, the 
product passes.  Of course now insect and herbicide traits are additional considerations for 
product choice. 
Corn seed is also selected on brand image, such as national brands of Pioneer or Dekalb; or 
some perceived value from a local company in a developed relationship with a farmer that 
involves trust.  
For soybean products, yield, disease resistance, and stand-ability of the plant are important.  
Convenience of handling soybean seed is important, large bulk units or totally bulk plays a 
part in the decision making process of the customer. Adding seed treatment at delivery time 
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is another factor in the decision making process.  Consideration of price per unit is a factor 
in the selection process.   
What resources and competitive capabilities does a seller need to have to be 
competitively successful? 
They need skill and ability to bring the right products to the market through internal plant 
breeding and biotechnology trait programs or by selecting products through the wholesale 
system.  A company needs highly skilled sales people in order to begin and develop long 
lasting relationships with a variety of customers. 
A company must be able to market themselves as a competent supplier as to develop a 
favorable image and gain the reputation of being that competent supplier of products.  A 
company needs to develop a delivery system for corn and soybeans.  Based on the concept 
that to move bulk seed far is a cost disadvantage and large customer may purchase from a 
local supplier that is closer by, based on convenience of pickup.  An example is Ross Seed 
Company from Fisher, Minnesota.  Steve Ross sells about 40,000 units of soybean seed 
within 30 miles of his processing facility.  He states that farmers are willing to travel this 
far for the products they want, but if farther than that, they will go to a closer facility. 
What are the key success factors needed for CSC to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage? 
Product: Due to the high cost of plant breeding and development of traits, CSC will need 
to access them through the wholesale market and by gaining agreements with trait 
providers.  Branding of products is essential to differentiate from others in the market 
place.  Selection of genetics that work in Minnesota will be important to bring the right 
seed products to market.  Research plots need to be more market focused to support the 
sales effort.  A high degree of ability to select seed products will be critical.  Trait products 
will have to be licensed through one of these firms; Syngenta, Dow AgroScience, Bayer 
CropScience or Monsanto.   
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Monsanto genetics and traits would be preferred today, due to the success their products are 
having in the market place. Without a Monsanto license, the challenge would be finding the 
right combination of genetics and traits in order to maintain a high quality of product.  It 
appears as though the majority CSC products will come with Liberty Link and AgriSure or 
Herculex 1 traits.  AgriSure is Syngenta’s trait trade mark for their trait products, there is 
access to this trait though licensing and the cost of the trait is similar to the Herculex trait of 
$26.00.  A rebate to qualified sellers potentially brings that cost down.  Dow AgroScience 
trait fees for Hexculex have been set at $26.00 per unit with volume incentives.  Volume 
incentives of 25 percent start with a sale of 2,000 units, incentives increase up to 41 percent 
for 80,000 units sold and additional sales maintain that 41 percent incentive.   This 
incentive provides large volume seller a competitive advantage that over smaller volume 
companies, of which CSC is one of them. 
Marketing - Brand Image: Skills and resources are needed to develop a positive 
reputation.  Also, the skills and resources to put an organization together to live up to that 
reputation, from proper products, right people with the right presentation, followed up by 
great service will all factor into creating a competent supplier.    
Sales:  CSC would need to find personnel whose behavior pattern is one of initiative, 
innovation, being flexible, and customer orientated.  Sales skills needs include being a good 
decision maker, the ability to work in cross-functional teams, an effective manager and 
being customer focused.  For a sale negotiation, they should build a relationship, plan their 
sales call, ask great questions and demonstrate good presentation skills, and they must have 
the ability to gain commitment.  The goal is to build long term customers.    
Distribution: The network that is set up under a District Sales Manger (DSM) will be the 
distribution system.  A focused area of distribution can result in a reduced cost for delivery, 
advertising, travel and product lineup, giving CSC lower costs for these activities.  
Convenience of pickup or delivery is critical for soybean sales volume.       
Organizational capacity:  According to Allan Gray, Michael Boehlje, Vincent Amanor-
Boadu and Joan Fulton there are three internal capabilities that are needed to assist an 
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entrepreneur to become successful.  Organizational knowledge, cognition, and social 
capital competences, in full measure, helps the business in finding a sustaining competitive 
advantage. 
Organizational knowledge is the ability to develop a cut above rest system that separates 
one firm from another.  This know-how is based on knowing what to do within the 
business, like when to sell, to ship products, to service customers, and ensuring quality of 
products to name a few.   
Cognitive skill is about sense making.  Sense making is the ability to foresee potential 
challenges and then move to position the company to meet the changing need of the 
customer.  Because everyone perceives challenges and opportunities differently, this 
capability differentiates the firm against another.  Arie de Geres of Dutch Shell wrote, “The 
ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive 
advantage” reminds us to be vigilante in learning about all aspect of our activities and how 
they correspond to present competitive advantages.   
The “who you know” is called social capital; this is about the ability to develop 
relationships that allow the firm with some potential advantages.  They could be lining up 
production in advance to reduce costs, and the lowering of storage due to favorable rates.  It 
could be a great relationship with a breeder, banker, or investor that allows for greater 
support and that leads to a potential competitive advantage.   
In an overview of the industry, this is what is seen today.  
1. The seed industry is a mature industry.  This usually leads to an unattractive and 
lower profit industry. 
2. Rivalry within the industry has increased pressuring profits for non-trait suppliers 
lower.  The concentration of large trait suppliers will continue as the battle for 
market share becomes more intense in the effort to gain economies of scale and 
lower average product costs.  
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3. Entry into the industry is limited by Monsanto, who has created barriers of entry by 
being selective in granting licenses.  Bayer, Dow AgroScience and Snygenta are 
still open to granting new entries.  Large firms will probably not leave the industry 
due to the asset specificity and economies of scope with other related crop 
production products.      
4. The power of the supplier is strong and continues to grow stronger as biotech traits 
become more accepted in the market place.  Trait fees and genetic costs have 
increased and these increases in cost reduce potential profit margins. 
5. The power of the buyer in the seed industry is strong and that keeps the potential 
profit margin lower.  Even though differentiation strategy and added value services 
can create increased revenue, buyers have choices and are price sensitive.  That can 
be seen by two phenomena, the growth of Monsanto’s market share and the growth 
of market share for all regional firms who price their products below the prices set 
by the majors. 
6. From the driving forces that cause the environment to change, the attractiveness for 
profit in the seed industry is very good for the trait suppliers and less attractive for 
non-trait suppliers. 
• The lack of a long term growth rate in the seed industry in the U.S. is a 
driving force that will continue to create rivalry and lessen the attractiveness 
of the industry.   
• Product innovation will continue to provide trait companies with above 
average profits while seed sellers will pass along the revenue and potentially 
keeping less for profit.   
• Exiting the industry is hard due to the specialized biotechnology products 
and production facilities only usable in the industry.  This causes large 
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companies to take offensive positions to stay in and earn above average 
profits, which sometimes is at the expense of industry wide profitability.    
7. In evaluation of CSC strategic position in the industry, it is an uphill battle against 
stronger rivals.  Stronger rivals meaning that their brand name, distribution and 
economies of scale provide them with a greater competitive advantage over CSC if 
it chose to enter the seed industry.   
8. CSC is not in a position to alter the industry attractiveness.   
9. The probability of obtaining a sustaining competitive advantage and above average 
profits for CSC in the seed industry is unlikely. Even though private owners may be 
willing to accept lower profit margins, entry into the seed industry is not attractive 
today. 
At this time an entry into the seed industry could be filled with challenges that create lower 
than average profits and potential financial risks.  The two main challenges are the power 
of the supplier and the power of the buyer. 
Today, the market accepts the value of Monsanto’s YieldGard® traits and genetics.  To 
have a Monsanto license to offer those traits is important to the customer for high 
performance and for the firm, hopefully a fair retail price.  The genetics of the product 
would have to be of high performance as well, but without economies of scale, I project 
that CSC may not have the first or even second tier of genetics.  That may affect perceived 
value received by the customer and retail price that could be charged.  At least in regards to 
the costs of the seed, as the study showed the higher retail price for traits did not allow for 
addition profit margins, it actually creates higher revenue with lower margins (Table 4.12 
to 4.15).   
Without a Monsanto license for genetics and biotechnology traits, CSC would need to look 
to Dow AgroScience and Syngenta trait products and the wholesale market for genetics.  I 
could argue that Dow’s Herculex is close in comparison in performance, and that Syngenta 
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Agrisure traits would be functional, but the value received by the customers as reflected by 
the declining market share of Pioneer and Syngenta, who use these traits, indicates average 
or lower performance.  That prospect creates a concern relative to one’s sale volume and 
potential profitability.   
Times have changed; CSC should look for other opportunities within their scope or 
continue to grow their farming business through increased size to capture potential 
economy of scale.  
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